Knowledge that Transforms

We study a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self-control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self-control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self-control and relate them to our representations.

The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice. The estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households, observed and unobserved characteristics of communities, and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures, as well as the self-selection of households into communities of their choice. We estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the Boston Metropolitan Area. The empirical findings reject myopic voting models. More sophisticated voting models based on utility-taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities.

This paper develops a continuous-time equilibrium model of a two-country exchange economy with heterogeneous agents and nontraded goods. Nontraded goods play the role of state variables that shift the marginal utility of traded goods. This affects prices and generates dynamic hedging demands that explain the well documented home bias puzzle in international equity portfolios. When calibrated to both consumption and production data, the model is able to generate significative home bias in equity portfolios. A new methodology, based on Malliavin calculus, is presented to solve for the portfolio policies along the equilibrium path. This methodology allows one to reduce the determination of equilibrium portfolio holdings to the solution of a linear algebraic system, rather than a partial differential equation.

Whereas most U.S. corporations are widely held, the predominant form of ownership in East Asia is control by a family, which often supplies a top manager. These features of “crony capitalism” are actually more pronounced in Western Europe. In both regions, the salient agency problem is expropriation of outside shareholders by controlling shareholders. Dividends provide evidence on this. Group-affiliated corporations in Europe pay higher dividends than in Asia, dampening insider expropriation. Dividend rates are higher in Europe, but lower in Asia, when there are multiple large shareholders, suggesting that they dampen expropriation in Europe, but exacerbate it in Asia.

Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers by Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak and HalJ. Singer. Published in volume 91, issue 2, pages 302-307 of American Economic Review, May 2001

Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade by Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos. Published in volume 91, issue 2, pages 353-357 of American Economic Review, May 2001

We examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information (controlled by a gatekeeper) and the homogenous product market it serves. The gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its Internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices. Gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where (a) the product market exhibits price dispersion; (b) access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe; (c) advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels, thus inducing partial firm participation; and (d) advertised prices are below unadvertised prices. Introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects.

A method is constructed for decomposing the variance of changes in incomes in the world into components, to indicate the most important risk-sharing opportunities among people of the world. A constant absolute risk premium (CARP) model, an intertemporal general-equilibrium model of the world, is presented to permit optimal contract design. For a contract designer maximizing a social welfare function, the optimal contracts maximize the equilibrium world real interest rate. Securities are defined in terms of eigenvectors of a transformed variance matrix. The method is applied using Penn World Table data on the G-7 countries, 1950–1992.