In skill-biased (de-skilling) technological revolutions learning investments required by new machines are greater (smaller) than those required by preexisting machines. Skill-biased (de-skilling) revolutions trigger reallocations of capital from slow- (fast- ) to fast- (slow- ) learning workers, thereby reducing the relative and absolute wages of the former. The model of skill-biased (de-skilling) revolutions provides insight into developments since the mid-1970's (in the 1910's). The empirical work documents a large increase in the interindustry dispersion of capital-labor ratios since 1975. Changes in industry capital intensity are related to the skill composition of the labor force.
In our paper we have used the New Economics of Labor Migration framework to trace the complex linkages that exist among migration remittances and agricultural productivity [in China]. Constraints in the operation of on-farm labor and capital or insurance markets (or institutions) provide households with a motivation to migrate and distort on-farm operations when labor leaves. In our household sample the net impact of migration and remittances on maize production is negative. (EXCERPT)
Empirical research on the permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) has found that consumption growth is excessively sensitive to predictable changes in income. This finding is interpreted as strong evidence against the PIH. We propose an explanation for apparent excess sensitivity that is based on a quantitative equilibrium model of household production in which permanent-income consumers respond to shifts in sectoral wages and prices by substituting work effort and consumption across home and market sectors. Although the PIH is true, this mechanism generates apparent excess sensitivity because market consumption responds to predictable income growth.
During the first fifty years of the American Economic Association (AEA), its leaders considered the teaching of economics to be an important subject for discussion and debate. AEA founders set as a goal ... to educate public opinion about economic questions and economic literature (Elton Hinshaw and Siegfried, 1991 p. 373). During the last 50 years, AEA leaders have largely ceded questions on teaching to specialists. In 1955, the Association created the Committee on Economic Education (CEE) and charged it with improving the status of economic within the profession, stimulating and encouraging professional work on economic education, and arranging economics-education sessions at the AEA meetings. The Association later revised the charge to include actively ... improving the quality of economic at all levels, from pre-college to college, adult and general economic education (Hinshaw and Siegfried, 1991). It is time to direct the attention of the entire profession, not just economic specialists, toward the importance of educating a broad spectrum of the public about economics.
The countries of East Central Europe (ECE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) entered the transition in 1989–1990 with a common heritage in agriculture: most land, regardless of its ownership, was cultivated collectively in large-scale farms with thousands of hectares and hundreds of member-workers; the commercial production from the collective sector was supplemented by subsistence-oriented individual agriculture based on rural household plots of less than one hectare; product markets and input supply channels were largely controlled by state organizations within an administrative command framework; budget constraints virtually did not exist. The persistent inefficiency of socialized agriculture was usually attributed to collective production, which is rare in countries with a marketoriented economy, and to farm sizes that were too large compared to the observed market ‘‘best practice.’’ The strategy of agricultural transition formulated in the early 1990’s accordingly envisaged a transformation from collective to individual agriculture as the ultimate goal. Individual farmers could form associations to ensure efficient farm services and engage in land transactions to achieve optimal farm sizes. Pragmatic considerations suggested an intermediate stage involving transition to downsized but still relatively large corporate or cooperative farms based on private ownership of land and assets and with radically modified, profit-motivated management.
The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply by Colin M. Campbell, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. Published in volume 89, issue 1, pages 325-334 of American Economic Review, March 1999
This paper presents a brief overview of fertility trends in post-transitional societies. Average fertility in the developed world reached a post-World War II maximum at 2.8 births per woman (bpw) during the peak of the baby boom in the late 1950s. Steep declines in the 1960s and 1970s left fertility below replacement reaching just 1.7 bpw during 1990-95. Below replacement fertility is now the norm in the developed world as well as in a small but growing number of populations elsewhere particularly Asian countries. This paper uses the total fertility rate (TFR) which is the most widely used indicator of period fertility to measure levels and trends in the fertility of populations. However ongoing changes in the timing of childbearing affect the fertility level measured in a given year or period. Examining parents childbearing intentions would be useful since TFR and other period measures of fertility may give misleading information. The findings state the reasons why current low fertility is unlikely to decline much further and may even rise in the future in a number of countries. The first reason is that the TFR is a hypothetical measure that can and often does give an inaccurate indication of the actual rate of childbearing of women. This rate is not as slow as implied by the TFR in many developed countries. A second reason for expecting fertility not to decline further is that couples in most post-transitional societies plan to have about two children.
Some recent empirical evidence suggests that stock prices are not properly modelled as the present discounted value of expected dividends and that empirical models incorporating nonlinear bubble components better fit the data. In this paper we show that the nonlinearity in the relationship between prices and dividends may arise from how managers choose dividend payout. In particular, we propose a model of managed dividends which can explain observed long-term trends in stock prices. This model of managed dividends is shown to be observationally equivalent to the popular intrinsic bubbles model.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
In their annual review of academic salaries, the American Association of University Professors observes large gender-related salary differentials. At doctoral-level institutions, male professors at the rank of full professor earn 11.4% more than women full professors. Data on academic labor markets from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients to evaluate gender differences in salaries and promotion probabilities. Differences in employment outcomes by gender are found using two methods: the Oaxaca decomposition is used to examine salary differentials, and duration analysis is used to estimate promotion to tenure. While gender salary differences can largely be explained by academic rank, substantial gender differences in promotion to tenure exist after controlling for productivity, demographic characteristics, and primary work activity.
Can we know how good future economic growth can be if we do not know how good it has been? Apparent changes in the structure of the economy, notably, the rise of information technology, skill-extensive technical change, and a potential reversion to nonmarket production, will serve to increase the effort needed to maintain our already tenuous grasp on measuring income, wages, and well-being. Piecing together available measures, the United States appears to have been experiencing substantial economic growth as measured by both per-family income and wealth. The well-known dispersion of income by education is evident, with earnings of those with less than high-school education on the decline, but rising for those with college education or more. For families in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) headed by a male aged 25–64, mean family income rose by 11.5 percent, from $58,585 (1997 CPI-U dollars) for 1983 to $65,292 for 1993. If one factors in a 1-percent per annum correction factor to the CPI (Matthew D. Shapiro and David W. Wilcox, 1997; Michael J. Boskin et al., 1998), average real family income grew on the order of 22 percent in 10 years. Rising family income is not explained simply by more workers per family, since the civilian labor-force participation rate rose only 1.5 percentage points, from 65.3 percent in 1986 to 66.8 percent in 1996. Nor does the rise in income appear to be the result of more market hours per week. If anything, hours per worker may have declined, overall. Average weekly hours in the private sector are reported to have changed only trivially, declining from