Knowledge that Transforms

To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
938 results ✕ Clear filters

Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches

American Economic Review 1999 89(5), 1216-1233
Our thesis is that poor countries are poor because they employ arrangements for which the equilibrium outcomes are characterized by inferior technologies being used, and being used inefficiently. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of one such arrangement. In each industry, the arrangement enables a coalition of factor suppliers to be the monopoly seller of its input services to all firms using a particular production process. We find that eliminating this monopoly arrangement could well increase output by roughly a factor of 3 without any increase in inputs.

Does Trade Cause Growth?

American Economic Review 1999 89(3), 379-399
Examining the correlation between trade and income cannot identify the direction of causation between the two. Countries' geographic characteristics, however, have important effects on trade, and are plausibly uncorrelated with other determinants of income. This paper therefore constructs measures of the geographic component of countries' trade, and uses those measures to obtain instrumental variables estimates of the effect of trade on income. The results provide no evidence that ordinary least-squares estimates overstate the effects of trade. Further, they suggest that trade has a quantitatively large and robust, though only moderately statistically significant, positive effect on income.

Workers Are More Productive in Large Firms

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 104-108
Wages are positively related to firm size. This relation was discovered by Henry L. Moore (1911) and later confirmed by, among others, Charles Brown and James Medoff (1989). The wage premium associated with working at a larger firm or plant is ubiquitous, but its magnitude varies across countries and over time. The reason for a size-related wage premium is harder to pin down. Paying supernormal wages to deter shirking, thereby saving monitoring costs, seems plausible, but a closer examination has led us to reject this explanation (Oi and Idson, 1999). At a big firm, the workplace is safer, and fringes are superior, so that these factors cannot be the source of a positive premium. It must be something else such as work effort. The theory that we advance is that employees at larger firms are more productive and hence command higher wages in a competitive labor market. The shape of the size–wage relation depends on technology, worker preferences, and working conditions other than size. It will change over time and across occupations.

Price Dynamics and Production Lags

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 81-88
This paper provides a new explanation of why inflation is sluggish in response to aggregate demand shocks and why aggregate output changes as result of such shocks. We argue that these phenomena are related to between inputs and outputs in the process, production lags for short. The broad intuition is that activities in a modern economy are interconnected through complex input-output relations, with within individual firms, and that it takes considerable time for cost and price changes to penetrate the entire input-output system. Our analysis provides a rationale for a prolonged inverse relation between inflation and unemployment. The paper suggests that the interaction of inflation persistence and unemployment persistence may offer a possible explanation of high and prolonged European unemployment. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers

American Economic Review 1999 89(4), 781-804
We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted “in context,” making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students.

Generational Accounting in Europe

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 167-170
In most member states of the European Union (EU), issues concerning sound and sustainable finances are high on the political agenda. This paper briefly reports the findings of 12 country studies that investigate the impact of the demographic transition on the intergenerational stance of current fiscal policy within EU, using the device of generational accounting as first developed by Alan J Auerbach et al. (1991).