Knowledge that Transforms

We argue that changes in the monetary and financial regimes over the last twenty years or so have been subtly altering the dynamics of the economy and hence the challenges that monetary and prudential authorities face. In particular, the current environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build up of financial imbalances, i.e. over-extensions in (private sector) balance sheets, which herald economic weakness and unwelcome disinflation down the road, as they unwind. As a result, achieving simultaneous monetary and financial stability in a lasting way may call for refinements to current monetary and prudential policy frameworks. These refinements would entail a firmer long-term focus, greater symmetry in policy responses between upswings and downswings, with greater attention to actions during upswings, and closer coordination between monetary and prudential authorities.

This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993–2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the ‘H-statistic’ by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar–Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.

Theory does not predict an unambiguous relationship between a country’s financial and legal institutions and firm size. Using data on the largest industrial firms for 44 countries, we find that firm size is positively related to financial intermediary development, the efficiency of the legal system and property rights protection. We do not find any evidence that firms are larger in order to internalize the functions of the banking system or to compensate for the general inefficiency of the legal system.

We propose a more complete conceptual framework for analysis of SME credit availability issues. In this framework, lending technologies are the key conduit through which government policies and national financial structures affect credit availability. We emphasize a causal chain from policy to financial structures, which affect the feasibility and profitability of different lending technologies. These technologies, in turn, have important effects on SME credit availability. Financial structures include the presence of different financial institution types and the conditions under which they operate. Lending technologies include several transactions technologies plus relationship lending. We argue that the framework implicit in most of the literature is oversimplified, neglects key elements of the chain, and often yields misleading conclusions. A common oversimplification is the treatment of transactions technologies as a homogeneous group, unsuitable for serving informationally opaque SMEs, and a frequent misleading conclusion is that large institutions are disadvantaged in lending to opaque SMEs.

We study the economic benefits from using credit scoring models. We contribute to the literature by relating the discriminatory power of a credit scoring model to the optimal credit decision. Given the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, we derive (a) the profit-maximizing cutoff and (b) the pricing curve. Using these two concepts and a mixture thereof, we study a stylized loan market model with banks differing in the quality of their credit scoring model. Even for small quality differences, the variation in profitability among lenders is large and economically significant. We end our analysis by quantifying the impact on profits when information leaks from a competitor’s scoring model into the market.

To explain persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high levels, Calem and Mester (AER, 1995) argued that informational barriers create switching costs for high-balance customers. As evidence, using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, they showed that these households were more likely to be rejected when applying for new credit. In this paper, we revisit the question using the 1998 and 2001 SCF. Further, we use new information on card interest rates to test for pricing effects consistent with information-based switching costs. We find that informational barriers to competition persist, although their role may have declined.

In this paper, we use a panel of 609 UK firms over the period 1980–2000 to test for the existence of a trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy, and for whether this channel plays an offsetting effect on the traditional credit channel. We estimate error-correction inventory investment equations augmented with the coverage ratio and the trade credit to assets ratio, differentiating the effects of the latter variables across firms more or less likely to face financing constraints, and firms making a high or low use of trade credit. Our results suggest that both the credit and the trade credit channels operate in the UK, and that the latter channel tends to weaken the former.

We introduce a modelling paradigm which integrates credit risk and market risk in describing the random dynamical behaviour of the underlying fixed income assets. We then consider an asset and liability management (ALM) problem and develop a multistage stochastic programming model which focuses on optimum risk decisions. These models exploit the dynamical multiperiod structure of credit risk and provide insight into the corrective recourse decisions whereby issues such as the timing risk of default is appropriately taken into consideration. We also present an index tracking model in which risk is measured (and optimised) by the CVaR of the tracking portfolio in relation to the index. In-sample as well as out-of-sample (backtesting) experiments are undertaken to validate our approach. The main benefits of backtesting, that is, ex-post analysis are that (a) we gain insight into asset allocation decisions, and (b) we are able to demonstrate the feasibility and flexibility of the chosen framework.

This paper sheds light on US stock price deviations from fundamentals by analyzing the time-series dynamics of post-1870 S&P valuation ratios. It employs a non-linear, two-regime framework that allows for different behavior over phases of the stock market cycle. Persistence in the ratios implies prolonged price deviations from fundamentals stemming from short run continuation fueled by investor sentiment during bull markets. However, the pull from fundamentals ensures that valuation ratios and prices move toward their equilibrium levels in bear markets. Impulse response functions highlight sluggish adjustment and indicate that the effects of positive shocks are more pronounced and long-lasting in bull markets. The main conclusion is that, while market sentiment plays an important transitory role, valuation ratios do mean revert and so prices reflect fundamentals in the long run.

Prior studies, such as Claessens et al.’s [Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholding. Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2771], suggest that deviation between ultimate control and ownership decreases firm value (due to the entrenchment effects of large shareholding). Using a sample of Canadian firms, we study the relation of ultimate control and ownership with an important dimension of stock liquidity – bid–ask spread. We find that stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component of their bid–ask spread and wider bid–ask spread. Our results are consistent with the notion that the ultimate owners of these stocks may have selfish agendas. To increase the probability of the agendas being implemented, the firms may have poor information disclosure, resulting in poor stock liquidity.