Knowledge that Transforms

Female workers earn $0.89 for each male-worker dollar even in a unionized workplace, where tasks, wages, and promotion schedules are identical for men and women by design. Using administrative time-card data on bus and train operators, we show that this earnings gap can be explained by female operators taking fewer hours of overtime and more hours of unpaid time off than male operators. Female operators, especially those with dependents, pursue schedule conventionality, predictability, and controllability more than male operators. While reducing schedule controllability can limit the earnings gap, it can also hurt female workers and their productivity.

New parenthood causes large decreases in labor market incomes for mothers but not fathers, a stylized fact known as the “child penalty.” We combine a simple household model with estimates of child penalties in heterosexual nonadopting, adopting, and same-sex couples to better understand what causes the child penalty in heterosexual nonadopting couples. Our results largely rule out giving birth and the father’s advantage in the labor market as mechanisms, leaving preferences, gender norms, and discrimination as the main explanations. In addition, our paper provides novel evidence on the impact of children on labor market outcomes of adopting and same-sex couples.

The categories listed below are used to classify books, book reviews, journal articles, and dissertations indexed in JEL, JEL on CD, EconLit. New changes to the classification system appear as soon as possible on www.econlit.org . The JEL classification system may be used freely for scholarly purposes. We suggest the following format: “JEL: A10, B10, etc.”

The list below specifies doctoral degrees conferred by U.S. and Canadian universities during academic year July 2021 to June 2022. Lists of degree recipients and subject classifications are provided by the university. Note: Dissertations without classifications may be found under “Y Miscellaneous Categories.”

Laurence Ball argues that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) could—and should—have bailed out Lehman Brothers so that it did not have to declare bankruptcy. He presents compelling evidence that it could have. I argue that the view that the Fed should not bail out Lehman is reasonable under the circumstances the Fed was in at the time. The Lehman bankruptcy is a case study in bailouts and the attendant moral hazard problem that expectations of bailouts create. The lessons learned imply a clear case for appropriate regulatory intervention to solve the problems created when governments cannot commit themselves to not undertake bailouts.

Editor's Note Our policy is to annotate all English-language books on economics and related subjects that are sent to us. A very small number of foreign-language books are called to our attention and annotated by our consulting editors or others. Our staff does not monitor and order books published; therefore, if an annotation of a book does not appear six months after the publication date, please write to us or the publisher concerning the book.

The categories listed below are used to classify books, book reviews, journal articles, and dissertations indexed in JEL, JEL on CD, and EconLit. New changes to the classification system appear as soon as possible on www.econlit.org . The JEL classification system may be used freely for scholarly purposes. We suggest the following format: “JEL: A10, B10, etc.”

Editor's Note Our policy is to annotate all English-language books on economics and related subjects that are sent to us. A very small number of foreign-language books are called to our attention and annotated by our consulting editors or others. Our staff does not monitor and order books published; therefore, if an annotation of a book does not appear six months after the publication date, please write to us or the publisher concerning the book.