Can Downstream Waste Disposal Policies Encourage Upstream "Design for Environment"? by Paul Calcott and Margaret Walls. Published in volume 90, issue 2, pages 233-237 of American Economic Review, May 2000
This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political “fundamentals” can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, and education finance as those of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, with credit constraints, lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality; hence the potential for multiple steady states, with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution, or vice versa.
This paper develops a unified growth model that captures the historical evolution of population, technology, and output. It encompasses the endogenous transition between three regimes that have characterized economic development. The economy evolves from a Malthusian regime, where technological progress is slow and population growth prevents any sustained rise in income per capita, into a Post-Malthusian regime, where technological progress rises and population growth absorbs only part of output growth. Ultimately, a demographic transition reverses the positive relationship between income and population growth, and the economy enters a Modern Growth regime with reduced population growth and sustained income growth.
The growth of nonmarital fertility, together with greatly increased divorce rates and an increased proportion of children living in femaleheaded households, has provoked considerable alarm about the demise of the traditional family and concern about potentially harmful effects on the well-being of women and children. In this paper, I briefly summarize recent attempts by myself and others to develop a coherent theoretical framework to integrate economic theories of fertility and marriage in order to better understand why the same men who play the breadwinner role within marriage may fail to support their children following a divorce or who, despite the “gains to marriage,” may prefer to father children out of wedlock rather than within marriage. I argue that such behaviors of men can be understood within a framework that takes into account the selfinterests of both men and women as they interact within a given sexual or marital match and as they interact in a broader “market” for sexual and marriage partners. At the level of a given match, the theory provides hypotheses about the determinants of voluntary child support by fathers who are divorced from or have never married the mother. It also suggests reasons why voluntary child support is likely to be inadequate and, consequently, provides some insight about the role of laws and administrative procedures designed to establish paternity, determine the size of childsupport awards, and enforce collection of awards. At the level of the market, under certain circumstances, theory produces results similar to those emphasized by William Wilson and Katherine Neckerman’s (1987) theory of outof-wedlock childbearing among the underclass.
Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates: Comment by Momi Dahan and Michel Strawczynski. Published in volume 90, issue 3, pages 681-686 of American Economic Review, June 2000
Charlotte Perkins Gilman's (1898) and Economics stands as a landmark in the feminist economic analysis of gender relations and increasingly is also recognized as a pioneering work of American institutionalist economics (see Mary Ann Dimand, 1995). Because it stands out so strongly as a major contribution, and Economics has been perceived as an isolated work, apart from links to Lester Ward's sociology and parallels with the contemporary writings of Thorstein Veblen. This paper, however, views and Economics as the culmination of four decades of American feminist economic thought, beginning with Caroline Dall and Virginia Penny, and draws attention to Gilman's connection with that tradition through Helen Campbell. This tradition is so little known that the names of these four women do not even appear in Dorothy Ross's (1991) excellent Origins of American Social Science, even though Dall founded the American Social Science Association (ASSA), referred to by Ross (1991 p. 63) as the mother of associations, including the American Economic Association, and even though Campbell won a prize from the American Economic Association for Wage-Earners (Campbell, 1893), which was published with an introduction by Richard T. Ely. Caroline Wells Healey Dall (1822-1912) first became interested in feminism in 1837-1838 as a result of Harriet Martineau's (1837) chapter on The Political Non-existence of Women in the United States and an address on women's rights given at the Boston Lyceum by Amasa Walker, an underground railway activist soon to become professor of political economy at Oberlin. In 1841, Dall (then Caroline Healey) attended a series of ten weekly conversations led by the feminist author Margaret Fuller, publishing her notes of these conversations more than half a century later. While teaching school in Georgetown in the early 1840's before her marriage, she undertook the first census of free blacks in the District of Columbia, in order to organize schools for them, and in the early 1850s, while living in Toronto (where her husband was a Unitarian minister), she acted as Canadian agent for a society aiding fugitive slaves. Dall remained in her native Boston with her two children when her husband sailed to India as a missionary (where he stayed for the remaining 30 years of his life). She reported to a women's rights convention in Boston in 1855 on the legal status of women, following with a series of annual reports on that status, and with organization of the New England Rights Convention in Boston in 1859. A precursor of Charlotte Perkins Gilman among American feminists, Dall went beyond the suffrage question and unequal laws on property rights to a critique of the economic role of women in a series of three public lectures in Boston in November 1859, published as Woman's Right to Labor; or Low Wages and Hard Work (1860). Together with two series of lectures on women's right to education and rights under the law, this series was incorporated in Dall's major work, College, the Market, and the Courts; or Women's Relation to Education, Labor, and the Law (1867). Dall (1867 [1972 p. 179]) attributed women' s discontent to restricted opportunities for paid employment, for it was no longer the case that every woman found, in spinning, weaving, and sewing in the active life of a ... household, full employment for time and thought. In moving from a survey of women's unequal legal status to a critique of women' s repressed economic role, Dall followed the same path as the British activist Barbara Bodichon (whose 1859 pamphlet, and Work, appeared in a revised American edition in 1959) and, later, Jeanne Chauvin (1892) in France. * Department of Economics, Brock University, St. Ca tharines, Ontario L2S 3A1, Canada (e-mail: dimandCc adam.econ.brocku.ca).
Author(s): Kletzer, Kenneth M.; Wright, Brian D. | Abstract: Borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk-averse party subject to endowment shocks. The surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties, including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign. The sole punishments consist of renegotiation-proof changes in the path of future payments. We show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever. That is, borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy, and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater. Long-term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short-term loans. The analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved.
Genuine change in the economic and social status of U.S. women did not emanate simply from their increased labor force participation but, rather, from their increase in professions and as “career women. ” Those changes first began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. We examine here one factor of momentous importance in this break with the past. The Economist (December 31, 1999) recently named it the greatest science and technology advance in the twentieth century. It is the oral contraceptive, known worldwide by its moniker “the pill.” In 1960 18.4 percent of professionals were women, as were 4.7 percent of “high powered professionals.”1 But in 1998 36.4 percent of professionals were women and 25.1 percent of the “high powered ” subset were. We explore in this article a series of connections that link the birth control pill to the increase of women in professional occupations. Our evidence for the impact of the pill relies largely on the timing of various changes. Changes in laws giving minors certain adult rights and lowering the age of majority enabled young and unmarried women to obtain the pill. Young women’s control over their fertility directly reduced the costs to them of engaging in long-term career investments. The pill also served to increase the age at first marriage and thus indirectly reduced a potential penalty of
This paper is a brief evaluation of the Eurosystem's monetary-policy regime after its first year, in particular of the extent to which it is similar to inflation targeting as practiced by an increasing number of central banks. I examine the Eurosystem's goals, framework for monetary-policy decisions and communication with outsiders. Criteria for evaluation are whether the goals are unambiguous and appropriate; whether the decision framework is efficient in collecting and processing information and reaching decisions that are appropriate relative to the goals; and whether the communication is effective in motivating decisions, simplifying external evaluation and thereby improving transparency and accountability. I also consider whether the actual instrument setting has been appropriate, given the informaion available at the times of decision.