Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate how shareholder-level taxes are capitalized into stock prices using a model that incorporates the investment and payout decisions of a firm and the investment alternatives available to investors. Shareholder taxes affect stock prices both indirectly, via the effect of taxes on corporate investment decisions, and directly, by reducing both the mean and variance of after-tax returns. In our model, tax capitalization is not eliminated by the presence of tax-exempt investors, does not depend on whether equity is composed of contributed capital or retained earnings, and does not depend on the tax rate faced by a hypothetical marginal investor.

This study investigates the relation between founding family ownership and earnings quality using data from the Standard & Poor's 500 companies. Existing literature has documented that financial reporting is of higher quality when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms and when there is greater demand for quality financial reporting. I provide two competing theories of the effect of founding family ownership on the demand and supply of earnings quality: the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect. The empirical results show that, on average, founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality. In particular, I find consistent evidence that founding family ownership is associated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. In addition, the results suggest a nonlinear relation between family ownership and earnings quality.

This paper demonstrates the existence of two different kinds of externalities induced by an auditor servicing multiple clients at the same time. First, we show that the capital market price for a client can increase in the number of qualified reports that his auditor issues to his other clients, thus producing a stock price externality. Second, when the audit firm has limited wealth, an additional client can actually decrease the audit quality and increase the average likelihood of audit failure relative to a single-client setting because of reporting externalities. Our analysis also demonstrates how requiring a more effective audit oversight mechanism can actually produce unintended consequences such as an increased likelihood of audit failures.

Post–earnings announcement drift is the tendency for a stock's cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an earnings announcement. We show that the drift is significantly larger when defining the earnings surprise using analysts' forecasts and actual earnings from I/B/E/S than when using a time series model based on Compustat earnings data. Neither Compustat's policy of restating earnings nor the inclusion of “special items” in reported earnings contribute significantly to the disparity in drift magnitudes. Rather, our results suggest that this disparity is attributable to differences between analyst forecasts and those of time-series models—or at least to factors correlated with these differences. Further, we document that analyst forecasts lead to return patterns around future earnings announcements that differ from those observed when using time-series models, suggesting that the two types of surprises may capture somewhat different forms of mispricing.

This paper investigates the press's role as a monitor or “watchdog” for accounting fraud. I find that the press fulfills this role by rebroadcasting information from other information intermediaries (analysts, auditors, and lawsuits) and by undertaking original investigation and analysis. Articles based on original analysis provide new information to the markets while those that rebroadcast allegations from other intermediaries do not. Consistent with a dual role for the press, I find that business‐oriented press is more likely to undertake original analysis while nonbusiness periodicals focus primarily on rebroadcasting. I also investigate the determinates of press coverage, finding systematic biases in the types of firms and frauds for which articles are published. In general, the press covers firms and frauds that will be of interest to a broad set of readers and situations that are lower cost to identify and investigate.

In this paper, we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes. We explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation. A distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in Paul [1992] produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients (VECs) and compensation earnings coefficients (CECs) are unrelated. Our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971–2000 rejects Paul's [1992] hypothesis of no relation. We also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation. Specifically, we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings.

Numerous accounting studies claim that investors fail to rationally price accrual‐related information and that investors are functionally fixated. This study documents the importance of performing robustness tests when testing economic or behavioral explanations for apparent accounting‐related security mispricing. We find that performing robustness tests that exclude a small number of firm‐year observations (approximately 200 firm‐year observations or about 1% of the entire sample) reveals an inverted U‐shaped relation between buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns and total accruals. An inverted U‐shaped relation is inconsistent with the functional fixation (earnings fixation) hypothesis. We conduct similar robustness tests for the abnormal accrual anomaly and the net operating assets anomaly proposed by other investigators, and also find an inverted U‐shaped relation between buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns and abnormal accruals and net operating assets. These findings are inconsistent with the explanations put forth by those investigators. Such evidence leads us to conclude that the accrual‐related anomalies are unlikely to be due to investors' inability to process accounting information, as suggested by the functional fixation hypotheses tested.

In this paper, we propose a rational learning‐based explanation for the predictability in financial analysts' earnings forecast errors documented in prior literature. In particular, we argue that the serial correlation pattern in analysts' quarterly earnings forecast errors is consistent with an environment in which analysts face parameter uncertainty and learn rationally about the parameters over time. Using simulations and real data, we show that the predictability evidence is more consistent with rational learning than with irrationality (fixation on a seasonal random walk model or some other dogmatic belief).

We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price. In addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than for those initiated by other executives. Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards. We do not find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher litigation concerns associated with insider sales. Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is sufficiently low.

Key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective, that is, they are difficult to specify and/or verify for contracting purposes. When a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents, discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms. Despite their optimality, however, discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information. Our analysis identifies circumstances under which this additional agency cost is small, for example, the subjective information signals are precise, or the number of agents participating in the bonus pool increases. When incentive schemes can be based on both objective and subjective performance indicators, the relative weights to be placed on alternative signals are shown to differ from the ones predicted by models with objective signals only. We also demonstrate that correlation in measurement errors has a different impact on the structure of optimal incentive schemes when the performance indicators are merely subjective.