Knowledge that Transforms

Prior studies of discretionary accounting choices have generally relied on one or more proxy variables to measure closeness to debt covenant restrictions without actually examining the existence or extent of restrictive covenants. This study tests the validity of the most commonly used proxy, the debt–equity ratio, by examining its relation to actual debt covenant restrictions for a random sample of U.S. firms. The results indicate that several versions of the debt–equity ratio capture the existence and tightness of retained earnings restrictionsand the existence of net tangible asset and working capital restrictions, but are unrelated to four other covenant restrictions.

This study examines whether components of operating, financing, and investing cash flows are differentially associated with annual security returns, as predicted by theoretical models in finance and economics. The results of the study indicate that disaggregation of net income into cash from operations and accruals does not contribute significantly to the security returns beyond the contribution of net income alone. However, further disaggregation of financing and operating cash flows into their components significantly improves the degree of association as predicted by theory. In contrast, we find no evidence of differential associations across components of investing cash flows.

This paper analyzes incentives for voluntary disclosure of proprietory information. Proprietory information, if disclosed, provides strategic information to potential competitors, but can be helpful to the financial market in valuing the firm more accurately. Focusing on a stylized model of a static entry game, we show that a fully revealing disclosure equilibrium exists when the prior of the market is optimistic or the entry cost is relatively low. When the prior is pessimistic or the entry cost is high, however, both non- and partial-disclosure equilibria obtain. Our analysis predicts that competition in the product market encourages voluntary disclosure.

This paper examines the bond and stock price reactions to the announcement of insubstance defeasances, and the motivations for the transaction. We find a reliably positive bond price reaction and a reliably negative stock price reaction. However, the bond price reaction is much less than would be predicted had the defeased bonds been made riskless. We find evidence suggesting that some firms defease to window-dress their earnings, some defease to avoid restrictions in bond covenants, and some defease as a use for excess cash on hand.

This paper analyzes voluntary disclosure strategies of a privately informed firm when the information is relevant for the market price of the firm and also for an opponent. Favorable information increases the market price but might induce the opponent to take a discrete action that imposes proprietary costs on the firm. It is shown that there is always a full-disclosure equilibrium. There can exist partial-disclosure equilibria with two nondisclosure intervals. Comparative statics show some counter-intuitive results, e.g., higher proprietary costs or higher risk of an adverse action can make disclosure of favorable information more or less likely.

Peter Brownell, Kenneth A. Merchant, The Budgetary and Performance Influences of Product Standardization and Manufacturing Process Automation, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 388-397

Auditing, Audit quality, Audit performance, Time pressure

In this study I propose and test a model that predicts individual analyst forecasts of corporate earnings per share (EPS) using the change in the mean consensus forecast of other analysts since the date of the analyst's current outstanding forecast; the deviation of the analyst's current forecast from the consensus forecast; and cumulative stock returns since the date of the analyst's current forecast. I find that these three variables explain about 38% of the variability in analyst forecast revisions. While there is evidence of a relation between changes in earnings expectations and price changes, virtually all of the explanatory power of my model arises from other analyst forecasts. Section 2 describes the data bases used and the sample selection process. Section 3 presents the model and method for predicting individual analyst forecasts. Section 4 reports the bias and accuracy of the predicted forecasts. Conclusions are in section 5.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether financial analysts with superior earnings forecasting ability can be distinguished on the basis of ex post forecast accuracy. I explore the question by estimating and comparing average accuracy across individuals, and by considering whether the observed distribution of analyst forecast accuracies differs from the distribution expected if their relative performances each year were purely random. Overall, I do not find systematic differences in forecast accuracy across individuals. Financial press coverage suggests there are superior financial analysts. For example, Institutional Investor's annual All American Research Team includes analysts rated by money managers as superior on a variety of criteria, including earnings forecasting, ability to pick stocks, and the quality of written reports. Clearly, financial analyst services other than forecast accuracy are valued by their clients. I focus on only one activity, earnings forecasting, for two reasons. First, forecast data are available, quantitative, and can be evaluated against observable earnings outcomes. Services such as insightful, well-written research reports are harder to evaluate quantitatively. Second, academic use of analyst forecasts as earnings expectations data in capital markets empir-

Auditing, Audit risk, Accounting errors, Strategic audit risk