Consistent with the credit channel theory of monetary policy transmission, this paper finds novel evidence that asset market liquidity as one of the proxies for the external finance premium explains bank liquidity creation. While efficacy of monetary policy depends on how banks create liquidity, the existing literature does not find any conclusive evidence that monetary policy variables explain aggregate bank liquidity creation. We use both stock market and the Treasury bond market liquidity as proxies for asset market liquidity, and find that: (1) asset market liquidity and credit-spreads explain aggregate bank liquidity creation and liquidity creation of larger banks; (2) stock market liquidity rather than credit-spreads or the Treasury bond market liquidity has robust and higher impact on aggregate liquidity creation; (3) while stock market liquidity better explains off-balance sheet liquidity creation, the short-term off-the-run Treasury bond liquidity has higher impact on on-balance sheet liquidity creation; (4) the Federal funds rate as a proxy for monetary policy impacts liquidity creation of smaller banks more than it does liquidity creation of larger banks

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation

Banks face a ‘behavioralization’ of their balance sheets since deposit funding increasingly consists of non-maturing deposits with uncertain cash flows exposing them to asset liability (ALM) risk. Thus, this study examines the behavior of banks’ retail customers regarding non-maturing deposits. Our unique sample comprises the contract and cash flow data for 2.2 million individual contracts from 1991 to 2010. We find that contractual rewards, i.e., qualified interest payments, and government subsidies, effectively stabilize saving behavior and thus bank funding. The probability of an early deposit withdrawal decreases by approximately 40%, and cash flow volatility drops by about 25%. Our findings provide important insights for banks using pricing incentives to steer desired saving patterns for their non-maturing deposit portfolios. Finally, these results are informative regarding the bank liquidity regulations (Basel III) concerning the stability of deposits and the minimum requirements for risk management (European Commission DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC

We examine the cost of liquidity in rates on CDs purchased by money market funds (MMFs). We find no evidence that rates vary directly with the size of CDs. However, we do find that large MMFs receive higher rates on large CDs than small MMFs. This suggests banks pay for (potential) liquidity

Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when exposed to a financial crisis? While banks honored credit lines drawn by firms during the 2007 to 2009 crisis, this liquidity provision was only possible because of explicit, large support from the government and government‐sponsored agencies. At the onset of the crisis, aggregate deposit inflows into banks weakened and their loan‐to‐deposit shortfalls widened. These patterns were pronounced at banks with greater undrawn commitments. Such banks sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates, but the resulting private funding was insufficient to cover shortfalls and they reduced new credit

Bank reliance on short-term funding has increased over time. While an effective source of financing in good times, the 2007 financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of banks and ultimately firms to such a liability structure. We show that banks dependent on wholesale funding contracted their lending the greatest during the crisis. Our results suggest, however, that in the financial crisis vulnerable banks passed the liquidity shock only to public firms and not to private firms. Loans to private firms were affected through a different channel, largely through higher retained shares by lead arrangers. Consistent with standard models of financial intermediation with information asymmetry, vulnerable banks increased their monitoring of informationally opaque firms for which the potential for informational rents is the highest

We propose a model where systemic and non-systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy is required. We find that it is socially optimal to override the decision of the central bank by the unconditional provision of liquidity support when the shortfall is large enough, i.e. in crisis times. The existence of systemic banks provides a rationale for the central bank to act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range of their liquidity shortfalls. However, the impact of systemic risk on the optimal allocation of the lender of last resort responsibilities for systemic banks depends on the relative size of counteracting effects

We investigate how the lending activities abroad of a multinational bank’s local and hub affiliates have been affected by funding difficulties during the financial crisis. We find that affiliates’ local deposits and performance have been stabilizing loan supply. By contrast, relying on short-term wholesale funding has increasingly proven to be a disadvantage in the crisis, which has seen inter-bank and capital markets freeze. By introducing a liable approximate measure for intra-bank flows, we detect competition for intra-bank funding between the affiliates abroad as well as an increasing focus on the parent bank’s home market activities. In addition, the more an affiliate abroad relies on intra-bank funding in the crisis, the greater its dependence on its parent bank having a stable deposit and long-term wholesale funding position. We consider changes in long-term lending to the private sectors of 40 countries by the affiliates of the 68 largest German banks. To obtain a more precise picture, we clean our lending data from valuation effects

We develop an infinite horizon macroeconomic model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch and bank runs. Whether a bank run equilibrium exists depends on bank balance sheets and an endogenous liquidation price for bank assets. While in normal times a bank run equilibrium may not exist, the possibility can arise in recessions. A run leads to a significant contraction in intermediation and aggregate economic activity. Anticipations of a run have harmful effects on the economy even if the run does not occur. We illustrate how the model can shed light on some key aspects of the recent financial crisis

Liquidity production is a central function of banks. High leverage is optimal for banks in a model that has just enough frictions for banks to have a meaningful role in liquid-claim production. The model has a market premium for (socially valuable) safe/liquid debt, but no taxes or other traditional motives to lever up. Because only safe debt commands a liquidity premium, banks with risky assets use risk management to maximize their capacity to include such debt in the capital structure. The model can explain why banks have higher leverage than most operating firms, why risk management is central to banks׳ operating policies, why bank leverage increased over the last 150 years or so, and why leverage limits for regulated banks impede their ability to compete with unregulated shadow banks