G REAT WORKS often do not immediately get the attention they deserve. David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature fell, in his own words, dead born from the press.' John Stuart Mill's Subjection of Women was received coolly (it was the only book of Mill on which his publisher lost money).2 Bertrand Russell has recorded his disappointment at the reception that Principia Mathematica got: I used to know of only six people who had read the later parts of the book. Three of these were Poles, subsequently (I believe) liquidated by Hitler.3 remaining three readers apparently got back to their old lazy ways soon enough: The other three were Texans, subsequently successfully assimilated-a result as bad as being liquidated so far as the effect on the deserted Principia Mathematica

This study examines the stock price reaction around the announcement of proposed changes in long-term managerial compensation packages. The evidence indicates that on average these plans are met with positive market reactions, i.e., shareholder wealth increases. Further, we are unable to differentiate the market reaction to various types of long-range compensation schemes. This result is consistent with the notion that firms with different characteristics will resolve their managerial compensation requirements differently. Thus no particular compensation package necessarily dominates all others.

Economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance, and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful. In this paper, we argue that previous cross-sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results. Using data that focus on individual executives over time, we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales. The results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

This paper investigates the internal managerial control mechanisms at the disposal of a corporation's compensation-setting board or committee. The hypotheses tested are that both compensation changes and management changes are methods used to control top management, and that the use of these control methods is motivated by changes in the firm's stock price performance. Public data from the period 1977–1980 support our hypotheses. We conclude that the firm's board creates managerial incentives consistent with those of the firm's owners, both by setting compensation and following management change policies which benefit shareholders