We analyze the risk-taking incentives of a financial conglomerate that combines a bank and a non-bank financial intermediary. The conglomerate's risk-taking incentives depend on the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is determined by the conglomerate's liability structure. We examine optimal capital regulation for standalone institutions, for integrated conglomerates and holding company conglomerates. We show that, when capital requirements are set optimally, capital arbitrage within holding company conglomerates can raise welfare by increasing market discipline. Because they have a single balance sheet, integrated conglomerates extend the reach of the deposit insurance safety net to their non-bank divisions. We show that the extra risk-taking that this effect causes may wipe out the diversification benefits within integrated conglomerates. We discuss the policy implications of these results.

While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be time-inconsistent or sub-optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. In contrast to the too-big-to-fail problem which mainly affects large banks, we show that the too-many-to-fail problem affects small banks more by giving them stronger incentives to herd

This paper assesses the impact of the ownership structure of banks and shareholder protection laws on bank valuations while controlling for differences in bank regulations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, families or the State control banks. Furthermore, (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on valuations. These results suggest that ownership structure is an important mechanism for governing banks

This paper examines the impact of the borrower–lender relationship on the explicit loan interest rate and collateral, as well as the correlation between loan interest rates and collateral. Using a simultaneous equation approach, we find that collateral has a statistically significant positive impact of 200 to 400 basis points on loan interest rates. We find this positive association to be stronger for personal (or outside) collateral than collateral provided by the firm's assets (or inside collateral). Finally, we find the economic impact of the borrower–lender relationship to be 21 basis points for one standard deviation increase in relationship length

Equity capital allocation plays a particularly important role for financial institutions such as banks, who issue equity infrequently but have continuous access to debt capital. In such a context this paper shows that EVA and RAROC based capital budgeting mechanisms have economic foundations. We derive optimal capital allocation under asymmetric information and in the presence of outside managerial opportunities for an institution with a risky and a riskless division. It is shown that the results extend in a consistent manner to the multidivisional case of decentralized investment decisions with a suitable redefinition of economic capital. The decentralization leads to a charge for economic capital based on the division's own realized risk. Outside managerial opportunities increase the usage of capital and lead to overinvestment in risky projects; at the same time more capital is raised but risk limits are binding in more states. An institution with a single risky division should base its hurdle rate for capital allocated on the cost of debt. In contrast, the hurdle rate tends to the cost of equity for a diversified multidivisional firm. The analysis shows that hurdle rates have a common component in contrast to the standard perfect markets result with division-specific hurdle rates

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.

This is the first study to examine both how well plan administrators select funds for 401(k) plans and how participants react to plan administrator decisions. We find that, on average, administrators select funds that outperform randomly selected funds of the same type although they do not outperform index funds of the same type. When administrators change offerings, they choose funds that did well in the past, but, after the change, added funds do no better than dropped funds. Plan participants in aggregate change their allocation decisions in a way that accentuates the changes in allocation caused by returns. The change in allocation due to the investment of new money and interfund transfers is about the same size, and in the same direction, as the change due to returns. Participant allocations in aggregate do no better than naïve allocation rules, such as equal investment in each offering.