The Northern Rock bailout has raised concerns about the ability of current supervisory arrangements to deal with banking crises. This paper uses a formal model of a lender of last resort to derive policy implications regarding the optimal allocation of decision-making authority. Thereby, it contributes to the policy debate in the United Kingdom by proposing reforms to the current supervisory arrangements

We revisit a method used by Das et al. (2007) (DDKS) who jointly test and reject a specification of firm default intensities and the doubly stochastic assumption in intensity models of default. The method relies on a time change result for counting processes. With an almost identical set of default histories recorded by Moody’s in the period from 1982 to 2006, but using a different specification of the default intensity, we cannot reject the tests based on time change used in DDKS. We then note that the method proposed by DDKS is mainly a misspecification test in that it has very limited power in detecting violations of the doubly stochastic assumption. For example, it will not detect contagion which spreads through the explanatory variables “covariates” that determine the default intensities of individual firms. Therefore, we perform a different test using a Hawkes process alternative to see if firm-specific variables are affected by occurrences of defaults, but find no evidence of default contagion.

Despite extensive monitoring, banking operations are often considered opaque, and despite explicit capital adequacy regulation, banks may have substantial discretion in their financing. Both monitoring and capital regulation have changed substantially over time, with the adoption of FDICIA being one important breakpoint. This article empirically studies seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by banks to understand how opacity and capital regulation interact to determine the timing of bank SEOs and their market valuation. SEOs both by banks that are undercapitalized relative to regulatory standards and also well-capitalized banks are fully discretionary when it comes to SEOs, even before FDICIA. Both undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks experience similar and significantly negative stock price reactions to SEO announcements, and also have similar prior patterns of insider trading and similar economic drivers of the issuance decision. Moreover, post-SEO abnormal stock returns are similar to benchmark returns for both types of issuers in the long run, suggesting that, contrary to the well-documented evidence for industrial SEOs, investors understand the value implications of bank SEOs upon announcement. The evidence implies that undercapitalized banks' SEOs are more discretionary and that all bank SEOs are less opaque than implied by earlier studies.

We analyze the relative advantage of option grants compared to stock compensation when shareholders are diversified. Our analysis recognizes a conflict that is largely neglected in the corporate finance literature. Shareholders want to maximize their portfolio value while capital budgeting rules direct managers to choose projects that maximize firm (equity) value. Options can reduce this conflict by motivating managers to avoid projects that enhance the value of one firm at the expense of another firm. Also, in our framework, relative performance evaluation destroys value for shareholders as it encourages firms to engage in cannibalistic activity. Consistent with the predictions of our model we find that firms with lower insider ownership, higher institutional ownership, and lower leverage tend to provide more option grants as compensation to their executives.

We investigate how company-level corporate governance practices and country-level legal investor protection jointly affect company performance. We find that in any legal regime there are a few specific governance practices that improve performance. Companies with good governance practices operating in stringent legal environments, however, show a valuation discount relative to similar companies operating in flexible legal environments. At the same time, a stronger country-level regime does not reduce the valuation discount of companies with weak governance practices. Our analysis suggests a threshold level of country development above which stringent regulation hurts the performance of well governed companies or has a neutral effect for poorly governed companies.

This study examines the performance of mutual funds managed by firms that simultaneously manage hedge funds. We find that the reported returns of mutual funds in these “side-by-side” associations with hedge funds significantly underperformed those of mutual funds that shared similar fund and family characteristics but differed in that they were not affiliated with hedge funds. Digging deeper into performance, we find that the underperformance was confined to return gaps, a return measure that captures the impact of unobservable managerial actions. Interestingly, mutual funds with investment styles that were most closely aligned to affiliated hedge funds generated reported-return alphas and return gaps that underperformed by the greatest amount. Finally, we find that side-by-side mutual funds received less of a contribution to performance from IPO underpricing than similar unaffiliated mutual funds or affiliated hedge funds. Evidence does not support the hypothesis that affiliations with hedge funds allow side-by-side mutual funds to attract superior stock-picking talent. Our evidence does not allow us to rule out the possibility that management firms maximized fee income by strategically transferring performance from mutual funds to hedge funds.

We examine the long-term return performance of U.S. IPOs underwritten by relationship banks. We show that, over one- to three-year horizons, IPOs managed by relationship banks experience buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns that are similar to those observed for a matching sample of stocks managed by non-relationship underwriters. This result holds even when the returns' skewness and cross-sectional correlation is accounted for. Further, we examine the calendar-time returns on a portfolio that is long the stocks underwritten by relationship banks and short ex-ante similar stocks taken public by non-relationship institutions. Again, we conclude that the two groups of IPOs yield similar long-run returns. These findings support the certification role of relationship banks and suggest that, in this respect, the effect of the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act has not been negative.

We analyze the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the context of a quasi-natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. Using the case of an emerging economy, Bolivia, which introduced a deposit insurance system during the sample period, we compare the risk-taking behavior of banks before and after the introduction of this system. We find that in the post-deposit insurance period, banks are more likely to initiate riskier loans (i.e., loans with worse internal ratings at origination). These loans carry higher interest rates and are associated with worse ex-post performance (i.e., they have higher default and delinquency rates). Banks do not seem to compensate for the extra risk by increasing collateral requirements or decreasing loan maturities. We also find evidence that the increase in risk-taking is due to the decrease in market discipline from large depositors. Finally, differences between large (too-big-to-fail) and small banks diminished in the post-deposit insurance period.

This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms’ willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries

Predictions of firm-level credit spreads based on the current spot and forward credit spreads can be significantly improved upon by using the information contained in the shape of the credit-spread curve. However, the current credit-spread curve is not a sufficient statistic for predicting future out-of-sample credit spreads; predictions can be significantly improved upon by exploiting the information contained in the shape of the riskless yield curve. In the presence of credit-spread and riskless factors, other macroeconomic, marketwide, and firm-specific risk variables do not significantly improve predictions of credit spreads. These results have important implications for credit-spreads modeling as well as for better understanding corporate capital structure and risk management policies.