It is commonly observed that the compensation paid to senior level executives depends on both accounting and security price measures of performance. The articles by Kim and Suh, Bushman and Indjejikian, and Sloan, which I have been invited to discuss, examine the issue of how much weight to place on these two measures in the contract. The first two papers analyze the role that earnings can play in removing the ‘noise’ in stock price in a rational expectations pricing model. The Sloan paper analytically and empirically examines the role that earnings can play in removing macroeconomic factors from stock price.

Recent empirical studies have indicated that spin-offs are value enhancing, yet the theoretical aspects of spin-off gains have not been as well explored. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of spin-offs. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment, which are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The trade-off specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, the paper considers whether and under what circumstances firm value could be enhanced by a spin-off. It is shown that a spin-off in which parent company debt is optimally allocated between the post-spin-off firms increases value by reducing agency costs and increasing the value of tax shields when the component firm cash flows are positively correlated. The optimal allocation is characterized in terms of the parameters of the technologies of the component firms. When the component cash flows are negatively correlated, under the sufficient conditions developed, a combined firm operation dominates spin-offs. Here, the coinsurance effect on investment incentives dominates the effect of a flexible allocation of debt across technologies in a spin-off.

Researchers agree that household equivalence scales are intended to measure the variation in income needed to bring households of different composition to the same welfare level. Researchers do not agree, however, about how the term "household welfare" is to be defined. This article traces the historical and philosophical development of three distinct definitions. When the conceptual bases of several popular methods for the estimation of equivalence scales are explored, it becomes clear that advances in theoretical rigor have not always worked to bring the literature closer to answering questions of policy concern.

This paper examines equilibrium in a market with free entry where consumers search and firms set prices on individual units of the commodity. The prices attached to newly produced goods are continuously adjusted. Prices attached to previously produced goods can only be changed at a cost. Thus inflation reduces the real price of goods in inventory awaiting sale. The presence of previously priced goods lowers the reservation price of customers. Thus, inflation cuts into the market power created by the need to search for the good. Consumer welfare is inverse u-shaped in inflation with a strictly positive optimal inflation rate.

Abstract. This paper examines a two‐consumption date principal/agent model in which the manager receives private information at the first date. After observing his private information, the manager (agent) selects both the capital and personal effort he will invest in production. Operating cash flows are realized at both dates and any uninvested funds at the initial date are either paid out as a dividend to the equityholders (principal) or invested in zero net present value investments that require no effort. The aggregate cash flow at the second date is paid out as a dividend to the equityholders. The compensation contract specifies the manager's compensation as a function of the information available at the two dates. The key issue is whether it is valuable to have the contract based on the agent's communication of his private information. As in a single‐consumption date model, communication may permit the implementation of more efficient incentives with respect to the manager's action choices. In addition, communication can facilitate the smoothing of the manager's consumption over the two dates. Direct communication can have positive value, but the analysis identifies a number of factors that can result in communication having no value. These factors include no direct preference for effort, public reporting of the private information at the second date, access to personal investments, and access to a dividend policy that will costlessly convey the private information through first‐date dividends. Although access to personal investments may make communication redundant (since it is an alternative means of smoothing consumption), the analysis identifies conditions under which the equityholders would prefer to use communication and restrict the manager's access to personal investments (since it can have a negative effect on incentives). Résumé. Les auteurs examinent un modèle mandant‐mandataire à deux dates de consommation dans lequel le gestionnaire reçoit de l'information privilégiée à la première des deux dates. Après avoir observé l'information privilégiée, le gestionnaire (c'est‐à‐dire le mandataire) sélectionne le capital et l'effort personnel qu'il investira dans la production. Les flux monétaires provenant de l'exploitation sont réalisés aux deux dates, et tous les fonds qui ne sont pas investis à la date initiale sont soit versés sous forme de dividendes aus. actionnaires (c'est‐à‐dire les mandants), soit investis dans des placements à valeur actualisée nette nulle et qui n'exigent aucun effort. Les flux monétaires totaux à la seconde date sont versés sous forme de dividendes aux actionnaires. Selon le contrat de rémunération, la rétribution des gestionnaires est fonction de l'information disponible aux deux dates. Le principal problème consiste à déterminer si le fait de baser le contrat sur la communication par le mandataire de l'information privilégiée dont il dispose présente un intérêt. Comme dans un modèle à une seule date de consommation, la communication peut permettre la mise en place de stimulants plus efficients en ce qui a trait au choix du gestionnaire concernant son plan d'action. En outre, la communication peut faciliter le nivellement de la consommation du gestionnaire entre les deux dates. La communication directe peut avoir une valeur positive, mais l'analyse permet de cerner plusieurs facteurs qui peuvent retirer toute valeur à une communication. Au nombre de ces facteurs figurent: l'absence de préférence directe pour l'effort, la communication publique de l'information privilégiée à la seconde date, l'accès aux placements personnels et l'accès à une politique de dividendes qui livrera sans frais l'information privilégiée par le truchement du versement de dividendes de la première date. Bien que l'accès aux placement personnels puisse rendre la communication redondante (puisqu'il s'agit d'un moyen de rechange de niveler la consommation), les auteurs définissent les conditions dans lesquelles les actionnaires préféreraient utiliser la communication et restreindre l'accès du gestionnaire aux placements personnels (puisqu'ils peuvent avoir un effet négatif sur les stimulants).

The influence of Schumpeter's notion of "creative destruction" may have led to an overemphasis on substitution between technologies in recent models of endogenous innovation. Historical examples of technological change suggest that new technologies may just as frequently complement older technologies, creating, rather than destroying, rents. Acknowledgment of the potential for both substitution and complementarity among inventions allows for a much richer characterization of the growth process, creating the possibility of threshold effects and multiple equilibria and bringing to the forefront the important role played by the expectations of inventive entrepreneurs.