A model where choice of occupation is sequential is applied to college graduates from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 to investigate how higher moments of occupational earnings distributions influence initial field of work. Individual specific life‐cycle earnings projections that incorporate option values of occupational mobility are generated, and the relationship between these pay measures and choice of initial occupation is explored within a multinomial logit framework. The findings indicate a strong positive relationship between these earnings predictions and the likelihood that college graduates enter an occupation.

Abstract We present a possible explanation for the lack of permanence of the very high levels of concentration of ownership that accompany leveraged buyouts. We first argue that some diffusion of ownership can be beneficial to the shareholders of a firm by encouraging the employees of the firm to enter into implicit contracts with the firm. The level of concentration of ownership that maximizes firm value is therefore that which trades off the well-known gains from monitoring with the gains from implicit contracting. We then argue that, in the process of concentrating the ownership of a firm that has excessively diffuse ownership to a level that maximizes firm value, investors in leveraged buyouts will choose an initial level of concentration of ownership that is very high. They will do so in order to put pressure on managers to breach existing implicit contracts. Following the breach of these contracts, investors will decrease the level of concentration of ownership to the level that maximizes firm value. There will be no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breach is incidental to the transformation of the firm from one that has excessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimal level of diffusion of ownership. No change in the concentration of ownership therefore occurs once the level of diffusion of ownership that maximizes firm value has been attained. JEL Classification: G30.

The event study is an important research tool in economics and finance. The goal of an event study is to measure the effects of an economic event on the value of firms. Event study methods exploit the fact that, given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices. Thus the impact can be measured by examining security prices surrounding the event. In this paper event study methods are described including some of the potential complications. An example is included to illustrate the approach.

An econometric analysis demonstrates that television ratings for NBA games are substantially higher when certain players ('superstars') are involved. Thus, these superstars are quite important for generating revenue, not only for their own teams but for other teams as well. Using the econometric analysis and additional information on attendance and paraphernalia sales, the authors estimate the value of Michael Jordan to the other NBA teams to be approximately $53 million. The positive externality superstars have on other teams can lead to an inefficient distribution of player talent. The authors examine several league policies that might be used to address the externality. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Abstract We show in any economy trading options, with investors having mean-variance preferences, that there are arbitrage opportunities resulting from negative prices for out of the money call options. The theoretical implication of this inconsistency is that mean-variance analysis is vacuous. The practical implications of this inconsistency are investigated by developing an option pricing model for a CAPM type economy. It is observed that negative call prices begin to appear at strikes that are two standard deviations out of the money. Such out-of-the money options often trade. For near money options, the CAPM option pricing model is shown to permit estimation of the mean return on the underlying asset, its volatility and the length of the planning horizon. The model is estimated on S&P 500 futures options data covering the period January 1992–September 1994. It is found that the mean rate of return though positive, is poorly identified. The estimates for the volatility are stable and average 11%, while those for the planning horizon average 0.95. The hypothesis that the planning horizon is a year can not be rejected. The one parameter Black–Scholes model also marginally outperforms the three parameter CAPM model with average percentage errors being respectively, 3.74% and 4.5%. This out performance of the Black–Scholes model is taken as evidence consistent with the mean-variance analysis being vacuous in a practical sense as well.

This article compares various measures of on-the-job training, from a new source that matches establishments and workers, allowing the authors to compare the responses of employers and employees to identical training questions. Establishments report 25 percent more hours of training than do workers, although workers and establishments report similar incidence rates of training. Both establishment and worker measures agree that there is much more informal training than formal training. Further, informal training is measured about as accurately as formal training. Finally, the authors show that measurement error reduces substantially the observed effect of training, in particular the effect of training on productivity growth. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

We present an information-based explanation for spinoffs. When the various divisions of a firm are spun off into several firms that have separate stock market listings, the number of traded securities increases. This makes the price system more informative. It improves the quality of the investment decisions made by managers and reduces uninformed investors' uncertainty about the value of the divisions. Both effects serve to increase the sum total of the market values of the spun-off divisions above the market value of the original firm.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G14, G34.