This paper examines the ability of financial statement measures of average and marginal tax rates (MTR) to capture tax attributes utilizing firm-level tax and financial data. The results suggest commonly used average tax rate measures provide little insight about statutory tax burdens, and may introduce substantial bias into analyses of tax incidence. Financial statement-based proxies for MTR, particularly those based on simulation methods, are found to perform well in estimating current year tax rates. Both current year and present value MTR are found to be highly correlated with an easily constructed binary proxy of firms’ tax status.

Engel/Hayes/Wang and Farrell/Whidbee provide new evidence on how firms weight alternative performance measures in making CEO retention and replacement decisions. While their results are statistically significant, firm performance continues to explain very little of the variation in CEO turnover. I argue we have probably reached a point of diminishing returns in estimating logit models that focus on the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance measures. We will have to consider other less-explored issues to increase our understanding of CEO turnovers and replacements. Analyzing age-related issues is one example.

Our analysis suggests that boards focus on deviation from expected performance, rather than performance alone, in making the CEO turnover decision, especially when there is agreement (less dispersion) among analysts about the firm's earnings forecast or there are a large number of analysts following the firm. In addition, our results suggest that boards are more likely to appoint a CEO that will change firm policies and strategies (i.e., an outsider) when forecasted 5-year EPS growth is low and there is greater uncertainty (more dispersion) among analysts about the firm's long-term forecasts.

In a sample of 2,794 initial public offerings (IPOs), we test three potential explanations for the existence of IPO lockups: lockups serve as (i) a signal of firm quality, (ii) a commitment device to alleviate moral hazard problems, or (iii) a mechanism for underwriters to extract additional compensation from the issuing firm. Our results support the commitment hypothesis. Insiders of firms that are associated with greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer period of time. Insiders of firms that have experienced larger excess returns, are backed by venture capitalists, or go public with high-quality underwriters are more likely to be released from the lockup restrictions.

Journal Article Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans Get access Andres Almazan, Andres Almazan University of Texas Address correspondence to Andres Almazan, Department of Finance, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, TX 78712-1179, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Javier Suarez Javier Suarez CEMFI Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 16, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 237–261, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0237 Published: 16 June 2015

abstract We examine whether differences in international capital mobility across countries are related to country‐specific differences in financial reporting environments. We hypothesize that countries where financial accounting environments lead to greater disclosure of value‐relevant accounting information are more likely to have higher international capital mobility. The results of empirical tests are consistent with our hypothesis.

Abstract Multiple delivery specifications exist on nearly all commodity futures contracts. Sellers are typically allowed to choose among several grades of the underlying commodity. On the delivery day, the futures price converges to the spot price of the cheapest-to-deliver grade rather than to that of the par-delivery grade of the commodity, thereby imposing an additional delivery risk on hedgers. This paper derives the optimal production and futures hedging strategy for a risk-averse competitive firm facing delivery risk. We show that the option value of the multiple delivery specification induces the firm to produce more with than without the delivery risk if the firm gauges this value higher than the market. We further show that if the delivery risk is additively related to the commodity price risk, the firm optimally under-hedges its risk exposure. On the other hand, if the delivery risk is multiplicatively related to the commodity price risk, the firm may optimally choose an under- or over-hedge which we illustrate using a numerical example. JEL classification codes: G11, D21, D81

Abarbanell and Lehavy provide evidence that analysts’ forecast errors are not normally distributed exhibiting a high occurrence of extreme negative forecast errors (left-tail asymmetry) and a high occurrence of small positive forecast errors (middle asymmetry). This is important for researchers who rely on techniques that are sensitive to the distributional assumptions of analysts’ forecast errors. Many of the conclusions drawn by Abarbanell and Lehavy, however, are based on visual impressions (as opposed to formal empirical tests) or based on methods that are very sensitive to the empirical methods used (e.g., whether the serial correlation of forecast errors is caused by the left-tail asymmetry).