The asymptotic single risk factor approach is a framework for determining regulatory capital charges for credit risk, and it has become an integral part of the second Basel Accord. Within this approach, a key parameter is the average asset correlation. We examine the empirical relationship between this parameter, firm probability of default and firm asset size measured by the book value of assets. Using data from year-end 2000, credit portfolios consisting of US, Japanese, and European firms are analyzed. The empirical results suggest that average asset correlation is a decreasing function of probability of default and an increasing function of asset size. The results suggest that these factors may need to be accounted for in the final calculation of regulatory capital requirements for credit risk.

Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on US banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe, Japan and Latin America. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) from its counterparts in the US and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation–states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.

This paper reports the results of a survey regarding the instances of plagiarism reported by journal editors in the economics profession. The survey finds that nearly 24% of responding editors encounter one case of plagiarism in a typical year. In addition, the survey reveals that less than 19% of responding journals have a formal policy regarding plagiarism. Moreover, there is a great deal of variance in what is considered plagiarism and what an appropriate response to plagiarism should be. A majority of editors believe that the economics profession would benefit from a professional code of ethics.

After a large bank merger, the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively, compensation gains might result from an increase in bank size regardless of whether the merger creates value. We examine mergers among billion-dollar banks in the 1990s and find results consistent with managerial productivity. Specifically, we show empirically that changes in CEO compensation after mergers are positively related to anticipated gains from merger measured at the announcement date. Other changes in the structure of compensation are also consistent with hypotheses based on managerial productivity and incentive restructuring.

This paper examines speculation spreads following initial acquisition announcements in 362 cash tender offers spanning the 1981–1995 period. Speculation spreads in acquisitions, defined as the percentage difference between the bid price and market price one-day after the initial announcement, are the starting point for arbitrage returns, a subject receiving increased attention in practice and in the literature. Speculation spreads exhibit a positive mean, with considerable cross-sectional variation. In fact, over 23% of speculation spreads are negative, indicating a post-announcement price greater than the initial bid price. In spite of its importance, the informational content of the speculation spread and the reasons for its cross-sectional variation have not been previously examined. We model speculation spreads as the visible component of total speculative returns of the target. Rational traders set speculation spreads anticipating the expected price resolution and length of the acquisition bid. Empirically, we find strong support for key implications of our model. Speculation spreads are significantly related to bid and offer characteristics observable ex ante. Consistent with our model, they are also significantly negatively related to the magnitude of price revision and significantly positively related to offer duration. These results are robust to the inclusion of bid and offer characteristics known ex ante as well as those only revealed ex post. The results are consistent with market pricing of both offer duration and price resolution at the time of the initial announcement.

AbstractThis paper investigates the forecasting accuracy of bankruptcy hazard rate models for U.S. companies over the time period 1962–1999 using both yearly and monthly observation intervals. The contribution of this paper is multiple-fold. One, using an expanded bankruptcy database we validate the superior forecasting performance of Shumway's (2001) model as opposed to Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984). Two, we demonstrate the importance of including industry effects in hazard rate estimation. Industry groupings are shown to significantly affect both the intercept and slope coefficients in the forecasting equations. Three, we extend the hazard rate model to apply to financial firms and monthly observation intervals. Due to data limitations, most of the existing literature employs only yearly observations. We show that bankruptcy prediction is markedly improved using monthly observation intervals. Fourth, consistent with the notion of market efficiency with respect to publicly available information, we demonstrate that accounting variables add little predictive power when market variables are already included in the bankruptcy model.

We examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing in firms’ early public years when they are lesser known. Our evidence suggests that retaining a Big Six auditor, which can reduce debt-monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of financial statements, enables young firms to lower their borrowing costs. Extant research implies that information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is decreasing in firm age. We also provide evidence consistent with our predictions that choosing a Big Six auditor affects firms’ interest rates less over time and particularly benefits firms with short private histories that initially experience worse information problems.