This study analyzes foreign exchange (FX) cash flow and equity exposures of a sample of U.S. multinational firms. Focusing on asymmetry in FX cash flow exposures to direction and magnitude of FX shocks, the study finds that asymmetry is pervasive in several alternative measures of FX cash flow exposure. Also, after decomposing FX equity exposures into discount rate and cash flow components, the study documents significant asymmetries in FX discount rate exposures. The latter finding implies that market-related factors in addition to cash flow–based arguments need to be considered when further exploring FX equity exposure. This study also highlights the importance of model specification: models with asymmetric specifications detect more firms with significant FX exposures.

Our study of the corporate loan pricing policies of U.S. banks over the past two decades shows that loan spreads for riskier firms become relatively lower during periods of monetary policy easing compared to tightening. This effect is driven by banks with greater risk appetite, measured from individual banks’ answers to the Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey. Our results hold with different fixed effects that account for time-varying observed and unobserved heterogeneity of credit demand and bank lending conditions that are not directly related to monetary policy. Together with our survey-based measure of bank risk appetite, we provide compelling evidence of the presence of a bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy in the U.S.

Abstract Variation in the composition of the defaulted debt pool and credit conditions at the time of default generate time variation in the distribution of recoveries on defaulted debt, and the related distribution of losses on portfolios of credit sensitive debt. We quantify the importance of accounting for such time variation in out-of-sample comparisons of alternative approaches to forecasting recoveries or losses given default (LGD) on defaulted bonds. Using simulations of losses on defaultable bond portfolios, we show that conditional mixture models improve forecasts of expected credit losses through capturing time variation in the recovery/LGD distribution. However, the best forecasts of instrument or firm-level recovery/LGD do not necessarily provide the best forecasts of portfolio-level losses, as the latter depend on the association between errors in the default and recovery/LGD forecasts. Our systematic comparisons of cross-sectional and intertemporal forecasting performance are enabled by a fast maximum-likelihood approach to estimating conditional mixtures of distributions.

Abstract In this article, we show that when banks increase their use of wholesale funding they shorten the maturity of loans to corporations. This effect appears to be linked to banks’ exposure to rollover risk resulting from their increasing use of short-term uninsured funding. Banks that use more wholesale funding shorten both the maturity of newly issued loans and the maturity of their loan portfolios. These results are not present among banks that rely predominantly on insured deposits. The link between wholesale funding and loan maturity is robust, and holds when we include firm-year fixed effects, suggesting that the decline in loan maturity is bank driven. In line with this premise, we find that the slope of the loan yield curve becomes steeper for banks that use more wholesale funding and that borrowers turn to the bond market to raise funding with longer maturity in response to banks’ loan maturity shortening.

Thomas Leonard's 2016 book Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era argues that exclusionary views on eugenics, race, immigration, and gender taint the intellectual legacy of progressive economics and economists. This review essay reconsiders that legacy and places it in the context within which it developed. While the early generations of scholars who founded the economics profession in the United States and trained in its departments did indeed hold and express retrograde views on those subjects, those views were common to a broad swath of the intellectual elite of that era, including the progressives' staunchest opponents inside and outside academia. Moreover, Leonard anachronistically intermingles a contemporary critique of early-twentieth-century progressive economics and the progressive movement writ large, serving to decontextualize those disputes—a flaw that is amplified by the book's unsystematic approach to reconstructing the views and writing it attacks. Notwithstanding the history Leonard presents, economists working now nonetheless owe their progressive forebears for contributions that have become newly relevant: the “credibility revolution,” the influence of economic research on policy and program design, the prestige of economists working in and providing advice to government agencies and policy makers, and the academic freedom economists enjoy in modern research-oriented universities are all a part of that legacy. (JEL A11, B15, D82, J15, N31, N32)

Abstract The dramatic increase in the percentage of mutual funds lending equities suggests that lending fees are an increasingly important source of income for investment advisors. We find that funds that lend equities underperform otherwise similar funds in spite of lending income. The effect of lending is concentrated in funds that cannot act on the short-selling signal due investment restrictions set by the fund family to diversify their fund offerings across styles. Our findings suggest that the family organization explains why fund managers lend, rather than sell, stocks with short selling demand.

We examine the impact of the Global Settlement on affiliation bias in analyst recommendations. Using a broad measure of investment bank-firm relationships, we find a substantial reduction in analyst affiliation bias following the settlement for sanctioned banks. In contrast, we find strong evidence of bias both before and after the settlement for affiliated analysts at non-sanctioned banks. Our results suggest that the settlement led to an increase in the expected costs of issuing biased coverage at sanctioned banks, while concurrent self-regulatory organization rule changes were largely ineffective at reducing the influence of investment banking on analyst research at large non-sanctioned banks.

Abstract We determine the optimal lifecycle purchasing strategy for deferred income annuities (DIAs)—which are distinct from single-premium income annuities (SPIAs)—for an individual who wishes to maximize the expected utility of his/her annuity income at a fixed time in the future. In contrast to the vast portfolio-choice literature for SPIAs, we focus on the stochasticity of the DIA’s payout yield and address concerns that rates are currently “too low” to justify irreversible annuitization. We assume a mean-reverting model for payout yields and show that a risk-neutral consumer who wishes to maximize his/her expected retirement income should wait until yields reach a threshold—which lies above historical averages—and then purchase the DIA in one lump sum. In contrast, a risk-averse consumer who is concerned the payout yield will remain below average for an extended period and worries about losing mortality credits while waiting, should employ a barrier purchasing strategy, as in the portfolio choice problem under transaction costs. We illustrate how this insight is applied in the context of annuitization. In fact, the optimal behavior of a risk-averse consumer resembles an asymmetric dollar-cost averaging strategy, with a portion of the DIA-budget spent even while payout rates are below historical averages. As part of our analysis we offer an easy-to-use asymptotic approximation for the optimal purchasing strategy (threshold) and provide some numerical examples to illustrate the concept.