Abstract By analyzing the portfolio allocations of target date funds (TDFs), we document that the observed durations of TDF portfolios are inconsistent with the durations predicted by classical portfolio theory. We call this stylized fact the duration puzzle. We investigate to what extent several extensions of classical portfolio theory can explain the duration puzzle. More specifically, we consider the impact of human capital, inflation risk, and portfolio restrictions on the duration of the optimal portfolio. We find that it is difficult to explain the duration puzzle, especially for individuals aged between 35 and 65 years.

Estimating comovement measures for a large set of bilateral foreign exchange (FX) rates, I explore the relation between firm-level FX exposure and its time-varying diversifiability. For a sample of U.S. firms, the magnitude of FX exposure appears to increase during periods of low currency risk diversifiability. Additional results suggest that the introduction of the euro exacerbated the effect of diversifiability on developed market currency exposure. Moreover, the low diversifiability of emerging market currencies seems to have a stronger effect on FX exposure than the low diversifiability of developed market currencies.

Abstract We introduce a novel strategy to predict monthly equity premia that is based on extracted news from more than 700,000 newspaper articles, which were published in The New York Times and Washington Post between 1980 and 2018. We propose a flexible data-adaptive switching approach to map a large set of different news-topics into forecasts of aggregate stock returns. The information that is embedded in our extracted news is not captured by established economic predictors. Compared with the prevailing historical mean between 1999 and 2018, we find large out-of-sample (OOS) gains with an ROOS2 of 6.52% and sizeable utility gains for a mean–variance investor. The empirical results indicate that geopolitical news are at times more valuable than economic news to predict the equity premium and we also find that forecasting gains arise in down markets.

Theory suggests that government aid to banks may either reduce or increase systemic risk. We are the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks, and those in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel that reduced market leverage by increasing the value of common equity. Results are robust to endogeneity and selection bias checks. Findings yield policy conclusions about whether to aid banks, the best targets for future assistance, and short-term versus long-term effects.

We investigate how supervisory enforcement actions (EAs) against banks affect their business borrowers. We find negative short-term valuation effects of EAs for large relationship borrowers, which are reversed after new loans are granted. Large non-relationship borrowers' valuations are unaffected by EAs, but turn negative after relationships are established with sanctioned banks. Additionally, sanctioned banks appear to offset uncertainty and reputational damage of EAs by improving credit terms and availability for relationship and non-relationship large businesses, but decrease credit availability to small businesses. The small business credit contraction may have significant negative economic consequences due to bank dependency and credit constraints.

ABSTRACT Auditing standards task auditors with collecting sufficient appropriate evidence to form audit judgments. Yet, cognitive psychology documents a robust finding in which people evaluate a bundle of relevant, directionally consistent evidence as though averaging the strength of the components. In consequence, a bundle of evidence may be viewed as weaker evidence than the bundle's strongest evidence item alone. We experimentally examine whether this averaging effect occurs in an audit context, and we test a potential moderator. In three independent mini‐cases, we ask auditor participants to make judgments about going concern, internal controls, and fraud risk. We present auditors with unfavorable audit evidence relevant to each judgment, manipulating whether we present a single strong evidence item or bundle it with a weaker evidence item. We also manipulate the auditor's initial impression of the client's state. We find that experienced auditors succumb to the averaging effect, making more strongly unfavorable judgments in response to the single evidence item than the bundle, and that this bias is reduced when the observed evidence is inconsistent with the auditor's initial impression. We interpret our results as consistent with the dual‐processing theory of cognition.