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Dual-capacity trading and the quality of the market

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1990 1(2), 105-124
This paper considers a securities market in which orders are channeled through professional broker-dealers such as London's market makers or the large banks operating on continental exchanges. If these dual-capacity dealers can judge the motives behind their customers' orders, they can trade profitably on their own account (even if they cannot “front run,” that is, trade on their own account before executing a customer order). It is shown that the dealers have an incentive to satisfy roughly half of their customers' orders from their own inventory if they are sure that orders are liquidity-motivated and not based on inside information. As a result of dual-capacity dealing, transaction costs for liquidity-motivated traders in the aggregate fall, but they rise for those traders who are unable to convince any dealer that they have no inside information. The liquidity of the main market worsens, even though its effective liquidity for customers whose orders are partly filled from broker-dealer inventories improves.

Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading

Journal of Finance 1996 51(2), 579-611
Trading systems differ in their degree of transparency, here defined as the extent to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. We investigate whether greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of uninformed participants. We compare the price formation process in several stylized trading systems with different degrees of transparency: various types of auction markets and a stylized dealer market. We find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every size of trade.

Wasteful Commuting

Journal of Political Economy 1982 90(5), 1035-1053
In this paper I examine the ability of the monocentric models to predict the mean length of commute in urban areas. I compare actual mean commute with that which is predicted by monocentric models and find that actual commuting distance is about eight times greater than that predicted by the model. Next I calculate the volume of commuting which would result if people chose their houses and jobs at random, making no effort to economize on commuting. This overpredicts actual commuting by about 25 percent.

Manipulation and Equity-Based Compensation

American Economic Review 2008 98(2), 285-290
Economists have long argued that a strong linkage between compensation and performance is essential for resolving the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and control. In particular Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990) were very influential in giving impetus to the view that such incentives were in need of strengthening. Compared to accounting benchmarks, the stock price is more forward looking, and it is responsive to all value-relevant information, including informal and unverifiable items of news. This makes stock and/or option awards an important part of optimal incentives, and constitutes a primary reason for seeking a public listing, as argued by Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole (1993). Until recently, however, theories of optimal executive compensation have generally ignored the possibility that the stock price can be manipulated or falsified. It is becoming increasingly clear that this is an important issue. In a spate of recent scandals, companies have misled the investing public by vastly overstating their profitability and prospects, and substantive restatements of company accounts have become increasingly commonplace. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that executive pay in its current form may be at least in part responsible. Recent studies finding a link between unusual movements in performance measures (such as accounting yardsticks and publicly disclosed price-sensitive information) and compensation include Daniel Bergstresser and Thomas Philippon (2006), Natasha Burns and Simi Kedia (2006), and Peng and Roell (forthcoming). Thus, the benefits of stock-based incentives should be weighed against their side effects. This paper models optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to influence the public perception of Manipulation and Equity-Based Compensation

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Journal of Finance 2014 69(2), 487-526
We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short‐term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long‐ versus short‐term performance and show how manipulation, and investors' uncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informativeness of prices. Firm and manager characteristics determine the optimal compensation scheme: the strength of incentives, the pay horizon, and the use of options. We consider how corporate governance and disclosure regulations can help create an environment that enables better contracting.

Market Making with Costly Monitoring: An Analysis of the SOES Controversy

Review of Financial Studies 2003 16(2), 345-384
This article presents a model of information monitoring and market making in a dealership market. We model how intensively dealers monitor public information to avoid being picked off by professional day traders when monitoring is costly. Price competition among dealers is hampered by their incentives to share monitoring costs. The risk of being picked off by the day traders makes dealers more competitive. The interaction between these effects determines whether a firm quote rule improves trading costs and price discovery. Our empirical results support the prediction that professional day traders prefer stocks with small spreads, but offer less support for the prediction that their trading leads to wider spreads.