This paper tests the effect of firms' mispricing and investment opportunities on the method of payment in mergers. Using a new proxy for investment opportunities and a sample of 1187 mergers completed between 1990 and 2005 among US publicly traded firms, I find that acquirers lead the decision on the method of payment, thus exploiting short-term market mispricing (in line with both the Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 and Shleifer and Vishny, 2003 models). However, target managers believe in the quality of the merger and care about the long-term value of the merged entity's shares (as predicted by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 and contrary to Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). I also find that better investment opportunities lead to greater use of stock.

We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.

Using the firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, we find that firms score higher on CSR when they have Democratic rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic rather than Republican-leaning states. Democratic-leaning firms spend 20 million more on CSR than Republican-leaning firms (80 million more within the sample of S&P 500 firms), or roughly 10% of net income. We find no evidence that firms recover these expenditures through increased sales. Indeed, increases in firm CSR ratings are associated with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct expense of firm value.

Firms sharing a board member with a media company receive more news coverage. This in turn affects those firms’ financing choices: they issue more bonds, rely less on bank loans, and have lower blockholder ownership. These findings are consistent with media coverage acting as an external governance mechanism that substitutes for monitoring by banks and equity blockholders. The effect of media-linked directors on financing is evident in panel and time series analyses and using two different instrumental variable analyses, suggesting a causal relation.

This paper examines the influence of CEO reputation on corporate proxy voting. Relying on prestigious business awards (through which the CEO is elevated to superstar status) as salient shocks to CEO reputation, we find that shareholders in aggregate, and mutual funds in particular, are more likely to vote with management (i.e., against shareholder proposals) when the CEO is a superstar. We use a battery of matching procedures to mitigate the concern that these results are driven by selection. We further show that shareholder proposals, especially contested ones and those with positive ISS recommendations, are significantly more likely to fail when the CEO is a superstar. Our results suggest that investors are sensitive to the external appraisal conveyed by the superstar status and prefer not to oppose management.

We model and analyze the interplay of capital structure and labor union reversible bargaining tools (such as union-sponsored shareholder proposals). Unions counter firms’ ex-post strategic use of debt by employing bargaining tools that can be reversed depending on firm performance. Firms adjust debt ex ante to make underinvestment a credible threat if the bargaining tools are not reversed. The use of reversible bargaining tools is negatively affected by debt, decreases for riskier firms when the state of the economy is low, and reduces the profits of safer firms. Consistently, we find that union-sponsored shareholder proposals are negatively related to leverage, decrease for riskier firms during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and are negatively associated with the profitability of safer firms.

We study the drivers of financial sophistication in small family firms. Sophistication is defined as the use of non-basic financial products such as options, swaps, debt restructuring, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset with detailed information on 187 Italian family firms. We find that the main drivers of financial sophistication are: (1) the generation that currently owns the firm; (2) the presence of a non-family CFO; and (3) the existence of a non-family shareholder. We analyze the impact of these factors on the following four classes of non-basic financial products: corporate finance, cash management, corporate lending and risk management. Our results can be used to determine the characteristics of financially sophisticated family firms and whether their corporate governance and ownership structure increase the use of non-basic financial products.