Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and Their Consequences argues that geography, technology, and wars determined the formation of a ruling class, inequality, and institutional development, rather than the other way around. Institutions are not a cause but a consequence. This relatively short book covers an enormous amount of material. I have sympathy for the basic idea of the book, but in some parts I would have liked to see more detailed evidence, especially on the more recent history and the Industrial Revolution.

The traditional approach to modeling political parties' behavior, based upon the contribution of Anthony Downs (1957), assumes that the parties' unique objective is to win elections: thus, they maximize their popularity. The crucial implication of this assumption for a two-party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters' preferences, full convergence of policies results from electoral competition. This is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem. ' More generally, it may be argued that different parties are differently because they represent different constituencies. Parties may not care only about winning elections per se, but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election. In this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se, but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies. This paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected, but also about which policy to implement, once elected. The dynamic inconsistency arises as follows: the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election. However, if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform, it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform. If voters are rational, they account for this incentive. Thus, in general, in a one-shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible, the two parties follow their most preferred policies, and the voters rationally expect this outcome. Full convergence of parties' platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election. Thus, these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians (for instance, Donald Wittman, 1977, 1983; Randall Calvert, 1985), which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms. Complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game. In fact, if the candidates have concave objective functions, the welfare-maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties' policies. However, this cooperative, and agreed-upon policy, may or may not be sustainable as a subgame-perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values; in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties, the degree of polarization of their preferences, and the relative popu*Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, and National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA, 02138. This paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at Harvard University. I am greatly indebted to Jeffrey Sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations. I also wish to thank Andrew Abel, Dilip Abreu, Olivier Blanchard, Ramon Caminal, Andrew Caplin, Alex Cukierman, Morris Fiorina, Benjamin Friedman, Herschel Grossman, Howard Rosenthal, and the referees for very useful comments. The responsibilitv. Af anv n mtnkieis Af cAlrirp nfnlv mine The result of policy convergence in a two-party system is more general than the median voter theorem. For discussions of convergence results not at the median, see John Ledyard, 1984; Peter Coughlin, 1984; Coughlin and Shmuel Nitzan, 1981; Melvin Hinich, 1977. For earlier work on spatial competition see Richard McKelvey, 1975; Hinich, Ledyard, and Peter Ordeshook, 1972, 1973, and the references quoted therein. The present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se.

This paper studies whether the dynamic behavior of GNP growth, unemployment, and inflation is affected by elections and changes of governments. The sample includes the last three decades in eighteen OECD economies. The authors' results are as follows: (1) the "political business cycle" hypothesis on output and employment is rejected; (2) inflation tends to increase immediately after elections; (3) they find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long-run partisan differences in the inflation rate; and (4) they find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment.

A widely held view suggests that politically independent central banks bring about relatively low and stable inflation rates.' A more debated question is whether one has to pay for this good outcome with more real instability. In his seminal contribution, Kenneth Rogoff (1985) suggests that an independent and inflation-averse central bank reduces average inflation but, as a result, increases output variability; the conservative central banker reduces the inflation bias, due to the time-inconsistency problem, but stabilizes less. However, Alesina and Summers (1993) do not find that, at least within the OECD countries, more independent central banks are associated with more variability of growth or unemployment. Thus, they conclude that independent central banks bring about low inflation at no apparent real costs. The point of this paper is to provide theoretical underpinnings to this finding, which is in contrast to Rogoff (1985).2 The basic idea is that one can isolate two sources of output variability. One is the economic variability induced by standard exogenous shocks that monetary policy is supposed to stabilize, for instance, money demand shocks or supply shocks. The second source of variability is or, more generally, policy-induced. This is the variability introduced in the system by the uncertainty about the future course of policy. For instance, Alesina (1987) studies the effect of uncertain electoral outcomes in a model where the two contending parties have different preferences over inflation and unemployment. An inflation-averse, independent central banker does not stabilize as much the economic variability, in order to keep inflation low and stable. This is Rogoff's point. However, by insulating monetary policy from political pressures, an independent central bank can reduce the variability. The overall effect of independence on output variability is, thus, ambiguous. This result is consistent, at least prima facie, with the evidence in Alesina and Summers (1993) on the lack of correlation between centralbank independence and output variability. In fact, it is possible that when the politically induced output variability is predominant, a more independent central bank reduces average inflation and the variance of output.

Does immigration change support for redistribution? We design and conduct large-scale surveys and experiments in six countries to investigate how people perceive immigrants and how these perceptions influence their support for redistribution. We find striking misperceptions about the number and characteristics of immigrants. In all countries, respondents greatly overestimate the total number of immigrants, think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant from them, and economically weaker—less educated, more unemployed, and more reliant on and favoured by government transfers—than they actually are. In the experimental part of our article, we show that simply making respondents think about immigration before asking questions about redistribution makes them support less redistribution, including actual donations to charities. The perception that immigrants are economically weaker and more likely to take advantage of the welfare system is strongly correlated with lower support for redistribution, much more so than the perceived cultural distance or the perceived share of immigrants. These findings are confirmed by further experimental evidence. Information about the true shares and origins of immigrants does not change support for redistribution. An anecdote about a “hard-working” immigrant has somewhat stronger effects but is unable to counteract the negative priming effect of making people think about immigration. Our results further suggest that narratives shape people’s views on immigration more deeply than hard facts.

Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about social mobility. Our randomized treatment shows pessimistic information about mobility and increases support for redistribution, mostly for “equality of opportunity” policies. We find strong political polarization. Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about mobility: their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions; and they support more redistribution after seeing pessimistic information. None of this is true for right-wing respondents, possibly because they see the government as a “problem” and not as the “solution.”

We review the growing literature on the political economy of immigration. First, we discuss the effects of immigration on a wide range of political and social outcomes. The existing evidence suggests that immigrants often, but not always, trigger backlash, increasing support for anti-immigrant parties and lowering preferences for redistribution and diversity among natives. Next, we unpack the channels behind the political effects of immigration, distinguishing between economic and noneconomic forces. In examining the mechanisms, we highlight important mediating factors, such as misperceptions, the media, and the conditions under which intergroup contact occurs. We also outline promising avenues for future research.

Politicians face a trade-off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies (or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent). This paper analyzes this trade-off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent. First, we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party's ideal policy and his own ideal policy. Second, we show that, often, the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision. Thus, politicians may prefer to be “ambiguous.”