For sophisticated institutional investors, active management outperforms passive management by more than 180 bps per year in emerging markets and by about 50 bps in EAFE markets over the 1993 to 2008 period. In U.S. markets, active management underperforms. Consistent with these patterns in returns, institutions use active management more frequently in non-U.S. markets, particularly emerging markets. Finally, we provide some evidence that one contributor to the active outperformance is institutional constraints on flows to non-U.S. markets. Overall, our results suggest that the value of active management depends on the efficiency of the underlying market and the sophistication of the investor.

This paper examines the role that organization structure and contract design played in resolving economic and political problems that arose during Germany's privatization process. We find that German officials structured organizations and contracts in a way that made credible the government's commitment to rapid privatization. This credibility served to protect the process from political and social opposition. In addition, it enabled Germany to attract talented private sector managers to its privatization effort. This began with the establishment of an independent privatization agency, the Treuhand. It culminated with the creation of another set of independent organizations called Management KGs, to which the Treuhand outsourced part of its restructuring, management and privatization work.

We examine how an investor collective action organization (ICAO) enhances activism by institutional investors. The ICAO initiated a new form of engagement—private meetings with independent directors to discuss governance proposals. Compared with a single investor acting alone, the ICAO has stronger incentives to engage in activism. Its dollar holdings and voting power are six times larger and predict direct access to the board and the firms it engages. Firms engaged by the ICAO are at least 58% more likely than non-engaged firms to adopt the ICAO’s governance proposals that include adoption of majority voting, say-on-pay, and specific compensation policies. Engaged firms also increase CEO incentive pay. An event study around the announcement of the ICAO’s formation shows a positive impact on value that increases in both dollar holdings and voting power. We conclude that institutional investors improve governance outcomes through collective action.

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.

We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance by focusing on Russia in the period 1999 to 2002. We find that an investment fund's lobbying increases coverage of corporate governance violations in the Anglo‐American press. We also find that coverage in the Anglo‐American press increases the probability that a corporate governance violation is reversed. This effect is present even when we instrument coverage with an exogenous determinant, the fund's portfolio composition at the beginning of the period. The fund's strategy seems to work in part by impacting Russian companies' reputation abroad and in part by forcing regulators into action.