This study offers several new perspectives on the effects of competition in takeover contests on bidder returns. Using a more extensive database than existing studies and employing several different measures of success in takeovers, we find that success in competitive acquisitions decreases shareholder wealth relative to both failure and success in observed single-bidder takeovers. Further, we consider and test hypotheses regarding bidder returns, including hypotheses suggested by the preemptive bidding theory. In general, our results neither support the preemptive bidding theory nor the hypotheses linking the method of payment and the observed level of competition. We also test hypotheses relating to returns across the multiple events in a multiple-bid contest that competition among bidders generates. The results of these tests underscore the importance of timing as well as success of a bid to the bidder's subsequent performance.

This paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing. Demand curves for our model's underlying assets (output products) may be downward sloping, in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption. Also, our marginal production(exercise) costs may be increasing. In addition, we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint. These elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system's value. We illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters.

This paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing. Demand curves for our model's underlying assets (output products) may be downward sloping, in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption. Also, our marginal production(exercise) costs may be increasing. In addition, we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint. These elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system's value. We illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters.

Cross-bolding occurs when listed corporations own securities issued by other corporations. We analyze the effect of cross-holdings on market capitalization and return measures as well as implications for econometric testing of asset pricing theories. We show that cross-holdings generally distort standard market return and risk measures. The magnitudes of such distortions are calculated for simulated economies by using a variety of cross-holding patterns. In addition, cross-holdings are shown to induce nonstationarity in the covariance matrix of security returns. We examine the effect of this nonstationarity for estimating efficient frontiers and factor structures. We also discuss the implications for risk-return estimates in equilibrium asset pricing models.

Paul D. Childs, Steven H. Ott, Alexander J. Triantis, Capital Budgeting for Interrelated Projects: A Real Options Approach, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 305-334

We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.

We develop a model that endogenizes dynamic financing, investment, and cash retention/payout policies in order to analyze the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. We show that the value of financing flexibility depends on the costs of external financing, the level of corporate and personal tax rates that determine the effective cost of holding cash, the firm's growth potential and maturity, and the reversibility of capital. Through simulations, we demonstrate that firms facing financing frictions should simultaneously borrow and lend, and we examine the nature of dynamic debt and liquidity policies and the value associated with corporate liquidity.

This article analyzes the interaction between a firm's dynamic investment, operating, and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs. Using numerical analysis, we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects. We find that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm's debt capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing. While higher financial flexibility (resulting from lower recapitalization costs) has a similar effect, production flexibility and financial flexibility are, to some extent, substitutes. We find that the impact of debt financing on the firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant.

This article analyzes the interaction between a firm's dynamic investment, operating, and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs. Using numerical analysis, we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects. We find that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm's debt capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing. While higher financial flexibility (resulting from lower recapitalization costs) has a similar effect, production flexibility and financial flexibility are, to some extent, substitutes. We find that the impact of debt financing on the firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant.

1. Financial Innovation and The Financial System. 2. Securities Innovation: A Historical and Functional Approach. CASES. 1. Financial Engineering and Debt Securities. 1.1 Arbitrage Fundamentals. Cougars. RJRCHC 1991. Arb in Government Bonds. Coca Cola--Harmless Warrants.1.2 Taxes, Regulation and Accounting: Stimuli to Innovation. Citicorp 1985. Note: Eurodollar Bond. New England Property and Casualty. Schroeders Perpetual. Metromedia.1.3 Securitization. Travelers. Note: MBS. Amex TRS Case. Lehman Case.2. Financial Engineering and Equity Securities. 2.1 Addressing Information Asymmetries. Arley. Avon PERCs. GM PERCs. ALZA series (A-B1-B2-C). British Telecom. RJR 1990. Sally Jameson.2.2 Taxes, Regulation and Accounting: Stimuli to Innovation. ARPPS. MMP. Dart and Kraft. Waste Management.3. Managing Issuers' Exposures. 3.1 Managing Issuers' Exposures. B.F. Goodrich-Rabobank. GM--Liab Management. State of CT Muni Swap. Walt Disney. Gaz de France. American Barrick. Enron.3.2 Managing Investors' Exposures. SLH (A&B). Goldman Sachs Nikkel Put Warrants. Commodity Linked Debt. Note: Commodity Futures. Fidelity Case. Diamond Shamrock Natomas. BEA Associates. LOR: Portfolio Insurance. LOR: SuperTrust.FOUNDATION NOTES. Note: U.S. Government Debt Markets. Note: Foreign Exchange. Note: FX Swaps. Note: Introduction to Options. Note: Option Pricing. Note: Contingent Claims Analysis. Note: Financial Futures. Note: Interest Rate Derivatives.