Many studies use the book value of debt as a proxy for its market value because most corporate debt does not trade. I call this practice the book value of debt (BVD) approximation, and it appears to be justified by the observation that the average market value of debt is close to its book value. Many corporate bonds, however, trade at values significantly different from their book values, and consequently the BVD approximation can create important biases. I compare the accuracy of the BVD approximation to Merton's option pricing (OPT) model of corporate debt valuation, and find consistent evidence that the Merton model provides more accurate estimates. I also show that this model is an easily estimated alternative to the BVD approximation. In short, the BVD approximation not only creates significant biases, but it is also an unnecessary simplification.

Previous studies ignore the fact that employee stock options are warrants because these options have been an insignificant component of firms’ capital structures. I show that this assumption is no longer correct. For example, for more than 36% of my sample firms, employee stock options represent a more significant claim on firm value than the firm’s debt and preferred stock combined. Moreover, in contrast to the suggestions of previous research, I show that employee stock options are a significant claim on firms throughout the economy, including larger firms, older firms, and firms in “Old Economy” industries. Finally, I show that the presumption in prior studies that employee stock options are not warrants causes a potential misunderstanding of the risk-shifting interests of securityholders and biases the analysis of capital structure issues.

I investigate the relationship between the amount of information provided by a firm's comparables (i.e., firms in the same line of business as the firm being valued) and the precision of the firm's equity valuation. When investors have more information, previous studies argue that investors can make a more precise estimate of a firm's true equity value and this implies a lower (excess) stock return volatility around corporate events such as earnings announcements. I develop a simple model that shows a negative relationship between the amount of information provided by a firm's comparables and the firm's stock return volatility. Using alternative measures of information provided by comparables and different definitions of comparables, I consistently find a negative and significant relationship between these information measures and stock return volatility, ceteris paribus.

Previous studies document negative long-term abnormal stock returns following seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuances and conclude that markets are inefficient. Other studies, however, argue that these results are a manifestation of risk mismeasurement (i.e., the bad-model problem), not market inefficiency. We test the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and avoid the bad-model problem by examining the long-term performance of our sample firms' bonds and stocks following their SEOs. Our results are inconsistent with the EMH. We also provide evidence that SEOs transfer wealth from shareholders to bondholders because SEOs reduce default risk.

This study shows the extent to which deviations from the absolute priority rule increase or decrease the bankruptcy emergence payoff to traded (i.e., usually junior claimants) bondholders. The data indicate that, on average, bondholders benefit, albeit slightly, from absolute priority rule (APR) violations. This paper also examines the degree to which the bond market, in the bankruptcy filing month, anticipates departures from the APR and other influences on the payoff to bondholders. In other words, we investigate the informational efficiency of the market for bankrupt bonds. Overall, despite the complex and lengthy nature of bankruptcy proceedings, the results support efficiency.

Claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of 30 filings under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. We measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents, on average, 7.6% of the total awarded to all claimants. Evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority, suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets.