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The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?

Journal of Political Economy 1992 100(6), 1208-1231
The authors analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock. They show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons. The authors use this model to analyze capital flight: in many poor countries, property rights are not well defined; since "safe" bank accounts in rich countries (the inferior technology) are available to citizens of these countries, they engage in capital flight. They show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare.

Exchange-Rate Policy for Developing Countries

American Economic Review 2000 90(2), 71-75
According to the IMF, in the mid-1970’s approximately 85 percent of developing countries had pegged exchange-rate arrangements. Since then, the situation has changed drastically; today most developing countries have either managed floats or flexible exchange rates. Argentina, Hong-Kong, and a few others may persevere with their currency boards; additional nations may well imitate them. And movements toward common currencies, a la the European Union, may gain strength here and there. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the political and financial prerequisites to adopt such hard pegs are extremely stringent. New attempts are the exception, not the rule. The question for most emerging market economies is no longer “To float or not to float?” but “How to float?” In this note we review some key issues in defining the right answer to this question.