Institutions—quality of contract enforcement, property rights, shareholder protection, and the like—have received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences, beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modelled within the framework of incomplete contracts. We show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity. Institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply, among other things, that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade. Second, we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade, using data on U.S. imports disaggregated by country and industry. The empirical results provide evidence of “institutional content of trade”: institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows.

This paper analyzes the effect of comparative advantage in international trade on a country's level of financial development. Countries with comparative advantage in financially intensive goods experience a higher demand for external finance, and therefore financial development. By contrast, financial development is lower in countries that primarily export goods which do not rely on external finance. We use disaggregated trade data to develop a measure of a country's external finance need of exports, and demonstrate this effect empirically. In order to overcome the simultaneity problem, we develop a novel instrumentation strategy based on the exogenous geographic determinants of trade patterns.

This paper proposes a new mechanism by which country size and international trade affect macroeconomic volatility. We study a model with heterogeneous firms that are subject to idiosyncratic firm-specific shocks, calibrated to data for the 50 largest economies in the world. When the firm size distribution follows a power law with an exponent close to minus one, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on aggregate volatility. Smaller countries have fewer firms and, thus, higher volatility. Trade opening makes the large firms more important, thus raising macroeconomic volatility. Trade can increase aggregate volatility by 15–20 percent in some small open economies.

This paper investigates the role of the top 100 firms in France in aggregate business cycle comovement. We establish that the top 100 firms (i) are important in aggregate; (ii) exhibit stronger international linkages than the rest of the economy; and (iii) contribute substantially to aggregate comovement.

This paper examines the mechanisms through which output volatility is related to trade openness using an industry-level panel data set of manufacturing production and trade. The main results are threefold. First, sectors more open to international trade are more volatile. Second, trade is accompanied by increased specialization. These two forces imply increased aggregate volatility. Third, sectors that are more open to trade are less correlated with the rest of the economy, an effect that acts to reduce overall volatility. The point estimates indicate that each of the three effects has an appreciable impact on aggregate volatility. Added together they imply that the relationship between trade openness and overall volatility is positive and economically significant.

This article provides a general framework to study the role of production networks in international GDP comovement. We first derive an additive decomposition of bilateral GDP comovement into components capturing shock transmission and shock correlation. We quantify this decomposition in a parsimonious multi-country, multi-sector dynamic network propagation model, using data for the G7 countries over the period 1978–2007. Our main finding is that while the network transmission of shocks is quantitatively important, it accounts for a minority of observed comovement under the estimated range of structural elasticities. Contemporaneous responses to correlated shocks in the production network are more successful at generating comovement than intertemporal propagation through capital accumulation. Extensions with multiple shocks, nominal rigidities, and international financial integration leave our main result unchanged. A combination of TFP and labour supply shocks is quantitatively successful at reproducing the observed international business cycle.

We document that international input-output linkages contribute substantially to synchronizing producer price inflation (PPI) across countries. Using a multicountry, industry-level data set that combines information on PPI and exchange rates with global input-output linkages, we recover the underlying cost shocks that are propagated internationally via the global input-output network, thus generating the observed dynamics of PPI. We then compare the extent to which common global factors account for the variation in actual PPI and in the underlying cost shocks. Across a range of econometric tests, input-output linkages account for half of the global component of PPI inflation.

When countries change most favored nation (MFN) tariffs, partners that trade on MFN terms experience plausibly exogenous tariff changes. Using this variation, we estimate the trade elasticity at short and long horizons with local projections. We find that the elasticity of tariff-exclusive trade flows is −0.76 in the short run, and approximately −2 in the long run. Our long-run estimates are smaller than typical in the literature, and it takes 7 to10 years to converge to the long run, implying that (i) the welfare gains from trade are high and (ii) there are substantial convexities in the costs of adjusting exports.

This paper evaluates the hypothesis that during the 2008–2009 collapse in international trade, imports of higher quality goods experienced larger reductions compared to low-quality imports, using data on US imports disaggregated by HS-10 product category and source country. We find little, if any, robust econometric evidence in support of this hypothesis.