Using a sample of publicly listed banks from 62 countries over the 1991–2017 period, we investigate the impact of capital on banks’ cost of equity. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that more equity in the capital mix leads to a fall in firms’ costs of equity, we find that better capitalized banks enjoy lower equity costs. Our baseline estimations indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in a bank’s equity-to-assets ratio lowers its cost of equity by about 18 basis points. Our results also suggest that the form of capital that investors value the most is sheer equity capital; other forms of capital, such as Tier 2 regulatory capital, are less (or not at all) valued by investors. Additionally, our main finding that capital has a negative effect on banks’ cost of equity holds in both developed and developing countries. The results of this paper provide the missing evidence in the debate on the effects of higher capital requirements on banks’ funding costs.

We examine, for the first time in the literature, the impact of social capital on the cost of bank equity worldwide. We reach two interesting conclusions. First, consistent with the view that the social capital of a region can constrain managerial opportunistic behavior, enhance the flow of information, and mitigate moral hazard and agency concerns, we find that banks from countries with higher social capital operate with lower cost of equity. Second, consistent with the view of a substitutional relationship between formal and informal institutions we find that the association of social capital with the cost of bank equity becomes weaker in countries with strong formal institutions. The results hold while controlling for numerous bank-level and country-level characteristics, as well as when we account for endogeneity with the use of an instrumental variables approach.

We examine the relationship between stock extreme illiquidity and the implied cost of capital for firms from 45 countries. We document robust evidence that firms whose stocks have a greater potential for extreme illiquidity realizations suffer from higher cost of capital. A one standard deviation increase in a stock's liquidity tail index leads to a rise of 30 basis points in the cost of equity. The reported evidence for stock extreme illiquidity is independent of the systematic extreme liquidity risk and extends to alternative cost-percent liquidity proxies. We further find that this relation is stronger in periods of down markets and high volatility and is weaker in environments with better information quality and stronger investor protection.

We examine whether the prevailing national culture has been material in determining bank performance during the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we focus on three particular national culture dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and power distance. We expect banks from high uncertainty avoidance and power distance societies to perform relatively better during the recent financial crisis. On the other hand, banks in individualistic (collectivist) societies are likely to perform worse (better) during the crisis. Using an international sample of 3438 banks from 48 countries, we find support for our main conjectures. Specifically, we establish that uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, and power distance have a first order impact on bank performance during the crisis. Our results are robust to a battery of additional checks, including additional variables, alternative samples, and correcting for potential endogeneity.

We study the determinants of a firm’s decision to issue one of the four available ADR programs (Level I, Level II, Level III, and Rule 144A). We find that the firm’s attributes (size, income, asset growth, leverage, privatization, ownership structure, and country-of-origin) and the firm’s home-country institutional variables (accounting rating and legal protection of minority shareholders) condition this choice. We also examine the issuing activity and the determinants of the ADR choice before and after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act. Following this structural change, we provide evidence of a reallocation between ADR programs. Compared to the pre-SOX period, firms from emerging markets, and those from countries with weak legal protection of minority shareholders, are more likely after SOX to choose Rule 144A and Level III, respectively.