This study explores close US congressional elections involving politicians who have influence over the SEC to examine the effect of firms' political connections on their financial reporting. This question is important in understanding the overall effect of political connections on financial reporting. Our difference‐in‐differences tests reveal no evidence that firms experiencing a relative increase in political connections report more opportunistically after close elections in anticipation of preferential treatment by the SEC in its enforcement actions. In contrast, we find evidence that these firms report less opportunistically in response to an increase in their connections with SEC‐influential politicians. Further tests show that our findings are unlikely to be driven by capital market pressure, managerial equity incentives, or corporate governance. Overall, our results are consistent with political connections mitigating opportunistic reporting through enhanced scrutiny by the SEC of politically connected firms' financial reporting. Our findings provide new insights into the interactions among political connections, SEC oversight, and financial reporting by showing how politically connected firms alter their financial reporting in anticipation of differential treatment by the SEC.

Most accounting studies use only public enforcement actions (SEC cases) to measure accounting fraud. However, private cases (securities class actions) also play an important enforcement role. We discuss the legal standards and processes for both public and private enforcement regimes, emphasize the importance of screening cases for credible fraud allegations, and show both yield credible fraud measures. Further, we demonstrate these research design choices affect inferences from prior research and a hypothetical research setting. Finally, we show common measures of accounting irregularities using Audit Analytics to proxy for fraud result in significant false positives and negatives and develop a fraud prediction model for use in future research. We recommend using both public and private enforcement with appropriate screening when examining accounting fraud to reduce Type I and II errors, or reporting the sensitivity of findings across regimes. This is particularly important given the reduction in accounting-related enforcement after 2005.