How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.<br/><br/>Highlights<br/><br/>► We compare conventional and Islamic banks across 22 countries with both bank types. ► Islamic banks are less efficient, but intermediate more, especially during crises. ► During crises, Islamic banks are better capitalized, with lower loan losses. ► Recent stock performance of Islamic banks due to more capital and lower loan losses.

Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of bank size and government deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. We find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its liabilities-to-GDP ratio, especially in countries running large public deficits. CDS spreads appear to decrease with stronger public finances. These results suggest that systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, especially if they are located in countries with weak public finances. We document that banks’ average liabilities-to-GDP ratio reached a peak in 2007 before a significant drop in 2008, which could reflect these private incentives to downsize.

We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.

For an international sample of banks, we construct measures of a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size defined as size relative to the national economy. We then examine how a bank’s risk and return on equity, its activity mix and funding strategy, and the extent to which it faces market discipline depend on both size measures. We show that bank returns increase with absolute size, yet decline with systemic size, while neither size measure is associated with bank risk as implicit in the Z-score. These results are consistent with the view that growing to a size that is systemic is not in the interest of bank shareholders. We also find that systemically large banks are subject to greater market discipline as evidenced by a higher sensitivity of their funding costs to risk proxies, consistent with the view that they can become too large to save. A bank’s interest costs, however, are estimated to decline with bank systemic size for all banks apart from those with very low capitalization levels. This suggests that market discipline, exercised through funding costs, does not prevent banks from attaining larger systemic size.