This article studies the determinants of college major choice using an experimentally generated panel of beliefs, obtained by providing students with information on the true population distribution of various major-specific characteristics. Students logically revise their beliefs in response to the information, and their subjective beliefs about future major choice are associated with beliefs about their own earnings and ability. We estimate a rich model of college major choice using the panel of beliefs data. While expected earnings and perceived ability are a significant determinant of major choice, heterogeneous tastes are the dominant factor in the choice of major. Analyses that ignore the correlation in tastes with earnings expectations inflate the role of earnings in college major choices. We conclude by computing the welfare gains from the information experiment and find positive average welfare gains.

Environmental quality in many developing countries is poor and generates substantial health and productivity costs. However, the few existing measures of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for environmental quality improvements indicate low valuations by affected households. This paper argues that this seeming paradox is the central puzzle at the intersection of environmental and development economics: Given poor environmental quality and high health burdens in developing countries, why is MWTP seemingly so low? We develop a conceptual framework for understanding this puzzle and propose four potential explanations for why environmental quality is so poor: (1) due to low income levels, individuals value increases in income more than marginal improvements in environmental quality; (2) the marginal costs of environmental quality improvements are high; (3) political economy factors undermine efficient policymaking; and (4) market failures such as weak property rights and missing capital markets distort MWTP for environmental quality. We review the literature on each explanation and discuss how the framework applies to climate change, which is perhaps the most important issue at the intersection of environment and development economics. The paper concludes with a list of promising and unanswered research questions for the emerging sub-field of “envirodevonomics.”

Using the value that a mutual fund extracts from capital markets as the measure of skill, we find that the average mutual fund has used this skill to generate about $3.2 million per year. Large cross-sectional differences in skill persist for as long as ten years. Investors recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with better funds. Better funds earn higher aggregate fees, and a strong positive correlation exists between current compensation and future performance. The cross-sectional distribution of managerial skill is predominantly reflected in the cross-sectional distribution of fund size, not gross alpha.

This paper examines how bank regulation and supervision measures affect the synchronicity of bank stock returns, a measure that is negatively related to variations in bank-specific fundamentals and stock price informativeness. Using data from World Bank surveys in 35 countries, we find that bank stock returns are less synchronous in countries with more stringent capital regulations, more supervision that emphasizes private monitoring, and less government bank ownership. On the other hand, direct government control of bank activities, as well as direct government monitoring and disciplining, do not reduce stock return synchronicity.

Knowledge producers conducting research on a particular set of questions may respond to supply and demand shocks by shifting resources to a different set of questions. Cognitive mobility measures the transition from one location to another in idea space. We examine the cognitive mobility flows unleashed by the influx of Soviet mathematicians into the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The data reveal that American mathematicians moved away from fields that received large numbers of Soviet émigrés. Diminishing returns in specific research areas, rather than beneficial human capital spillovers, dominated the cognitive mobility decisions of knowledge producers.

This survey summarizes the main research findings about teaching economics to undergraduates. After briefly reviewing the history of research on undergraduate economic education, it discusses the status of the economics major—numbers and trends, goals, coursework, outcomes, and the principles courses. Some economic theory is used to explain the likely effects of pedagogical decisions of faculty and the learning choices that students make. Major results from empirical research are reviewed from the professor perspective on such topics as teaching methods, online technology, class size, and textbooks. Studies of student learning are discussed in relation to study time, grades, attendance, math aptitude, and cheating. The last section discusses changes in the composition of faculty who teach undergraduate economics and effects from changes in instructional technology and then presents findings from the research about measuring teaching effectiveness and the value of teacher training.

We study managerial turnover for both internally managed mutual funds and those managed externally by subadvisors. We argue that turnover of subadvisors provides sharper tests and helps address several unresolved issues and puzzles from the previous literature. We find dramatically stronger inverse relations between subadvisor departures and lagged returns, and new evidence on how past flow predicts turnover. We find no evidence of improvements in return performance related to departures, but flow improvements are associated with departures of poor past performers. Our findings represent new evidence on how investors, sponsors, and boards learn about and evaluate mutual fund management performance.

The problem of global climate change presents overwhelming factual, analytical, and normative challenges. Nordhaus surveys this terrain bravely and mostly successfully. He explains the scientific/economic consensus that the planet is warming, that people are responsible, that the consequences are bad, and that immediate action is benefit/ cost justified. He also discusses the efficient policy response, and the challenges of achieving coordinated global action. His approach is mostly that of standard neoclassical economics, and some of the limitations of that paradigm in this context are not addressed. But overall, The Climate Casino provides an excellent self-contained introduction to the subject.

We exploit the exogenous shock to the Brazilian banking system caused by the international turmoil of 2008 and find evidence that the run to systemically important banks is better explained by the perception of a too-big-to-fail policy than by bank fundamentals. We infer that the extra inflow of deposits received by systemically important banks during crises gives them an important competitive advantage. Our analysis also indicates that a bank’s share of funding from institutional investors affects the nonfinancial firms’ and institutional investors’ decision to run.

Both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler's incentive to minimize expected costs of moral-hazard rents for high officials. We consider a dynamic moral-hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince, who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises. To minimize costs, a governor's rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay. In the long run, we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler. Dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions, but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices, and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring. A soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low-credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low. [Former title: "Leadership, trust, and power: dynamic moral hazard in high office."