This is the raw data that is used for "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." The data contains a household survey, key informant survey, meeting surveys, and an engineering road survey.

This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied Indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips, during which they observed over 6,000 illegal payments to police, soldiers, and weigh station attendants. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments. We further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes, including third‐degree price discrimination and a menu of two‐part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy.

Economic growth within countries varies sharply across decades.This paper examines one explanation for these sustained shifts in growth-changes in the national leader.We use deaths of leaders while in office as a source of exogenous variation in leadership, and ask whether these plausibly exogenous leadership transitions are associated with shifts in country growth rates.We find robust evidence that leaders matter for growth.The results suggest that the effects of individual leaders are strongest in autocratic settings where there are fewer constraints on a leader's power.Leaders also appear to affect policy outcomes, particularly monetary policy.The results suggest that individual leaders can play crucial roles in shaping the growth of nations."There is no number two, three, or four . . .

This paper investigates the remarkable extremes of growth experiences within countries and the changes that occur across growth transitions. We find two main results. First, virtually all but the very richest countries experience both growth miracles and failures over substantial periods. Second, growth accelerations and collapses are asymmetric phenomena. Collapses typically feature reduced investment amidst increasing price instability, whereas growth takeoffs are primarily associated with large expansions in international trade. The results show that even very poor countries regularly grow rapidly, but sustaining growth is difficult and may pose a very different set of challenges than starting it. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Social protection programs have become increasingly widespread in low- and middle-income countries, with their own distinct characteristics to match the environments in which they are operating. This paper reviews the growing literature on the design and impact of these programs. We review how to identify potential beneficiaries given the large informal sector, the design and implementation of redistribution and income support programs, and the challenges and potential of social insurance. We use our frameworks as a guide for consolidating and organizing the existing literature and also to highlight areas and questions for future research.

Many social insurance programs have low take-up, but it is unclear whether this is due to administrative barriers, information, or low insurance valuations. We study a Thai policy that offered large incentives for informal workers in selected provinces to enroll. The incentives increased insurance coverage by 67 percentage points- from 6 percent of informal workers to 73 percent- within two months. However, 12 months later, only 13 percent remained insured. Using choices among insurance tiers to back out revealed valuations, we find that low social insurance enrollment may be due to low ex-ante valuations of insurance, rather than administrative barriers.

Redistribution programs in developing countries often “leak” because local officials do not implement programs as the central government intends. We study one approach to reducing leakage. In an experiment in over 550 villages, we test whether mailing cards with program information to targeted beneficiaries increases the subsidy they receive from a subsidized rice program. On net, beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. Ineligible households received no less, so this represents substantially lower leakage.

Can information from a credible messenger shift behavior in an information-saturated environment? In a randomized controlled trial involving twenty-eight million individuals in West Bengal, we find that SMS-delivered video messages containing information about COVID-19 symptoms and health-preserving behaviors recorded by a credible messenger increased adherence to targeted and non-targeted preventive behaviors, measured by two objective measures (symptoms reported to a health worker, and phone usage at home), as well as self-reported behaviors. We find large spillovers onto non-targeted recipients. Credible light-touch messaging can play an important role in crisis response, even when similar information is widely available.