Using a data set covering one quarter of the U.S. general-purpose credit card market, we document that 29% of accounts regularly make payments at or near the minimum payment. To explain the prevalence of low payment amounts, we exploit changes in issuers’ minimum payment formulas to quantify the explanatory power of two potential theories: liquidity constraints and anchoring. At least 22% of near-minimum payers (and 9% of all accounts) respond to the formula changes in a manner consistent with anchoring as opposed to liquidity constraints alone. Our results show that anchoring to a salient contractual term has a significant impact on household repayment decisions.

We provide novel evidence of misaligned incentives fueling a portion of the 2000s mortgage boom. We document that private mortgage insurance (PMI) companies expanded insurance issuance on high-risk mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at the tail end of the housing boom, without changing pricing and despite knowledge of heightened housing risk. The expansion of PMI facilitated an unprecedented increase in Fannie and Freddie’s risky purchases, extending the mortgage boom into 2007 and precipitating their collapse. We argue that this unraveling reflects a general moral hazard problem in insurance, coupled with misaligned incentives in the government-backed mortgage market.

Credit record panel data from 1999–2010 indicates that the likelihood of home equity extraction (borrowing, on average, about $40,000 against one's home) peaked in 2003 when mortgage rates reached historic lows. We estimate a 27 percent rise in extraction in response to a 100 basis point rate decline, and that house price growth amplifies this relationship. Differential responses to interest rates and home price appreciation by borrower age and credit score provide new evidence of financial frictions. Finally, equity extractions are associated with higher default risk, consistent with the use of borrowed funds for consumption or illiquid investment. (JEL D14, E43, E52, G12, R31)

This paper explores the dynamics of unsecured credit supply over the recent credit cycle and around the passage of the CARD Act. We examine a unique data set of over 200,000 credit card mail solicitations to a representative sample of households and introduce credit card offers as a direct, informative measure of supply of such credit. Contrasting personal credit card offer dynamics before and after the passage of the CARD Act with those of personal loans, auto loans, and corporate credit cards, we find that lenders reduced credit supply of personal credit cards to nonprime borrowers in response to the CARD Act. Our analysis highlights the importance of separately examining supply and demand responses to assess the unintended consequences of regulation. Received January 30, 2016; editorial decision August 9, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

This article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the U.S. housing market. Using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank-held loans, we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders' screening decisions in the subprime market for low-documentation loans through two channels: the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan. The change in decision-making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors. Examining the time-series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings. We exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders. Our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders' underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non-agency markets, with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized.

A central question surrounding the current subprime crisis is whether the securitization process reduced the incentives of financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers. We examine this issue empirically using data on securitized subprime mortgage loan contracts in the United States. We exploit a specific rule of thumb in the lending market to generate exogenous variation in the ease of securitization and compare the composition and performance of lenders' portfolios around the ad hoc threshold. Conditional on being securitized, the portfolio with greater ease of securitization defaults by around 10%–25% more than a similar risk profile group with a lesser ease of securitization. We conduct additional analyses to rule out differential selection by market participants around the threshold and lenders employing an optimal screening cutoff unrelated to securitization as alternative explanations. The results are confined to loans where intermediaries' screening effort may be relevant and soft information about borrowers determines their creditworthiness. Our findings suggest that existing securitization practices did adversely affect the screening incentives of subprime lenders.

We explore how much borrowers value student debt relief in the setting of the federal Teacher Loan Forgiveness program, which cancels between $5,000 and $17,500 in debt for teachers at high-need schools. Using both quasi-experimental evidence and a randomized controlled trial, we find that neither eligibility nor a targeted information intervention affects employment decisions. Information was found to increase application and receipt rates for teachers who had achieved eligibility. Evidence from contingent valuation surveys suggests that teachers do in general value debt relief. Incorporating qualitative evidence, we conclude that take-up may be constrained by program complexity and administrative barriers.

Regional shocks are an important feature of the US economy. Households' ability to self-insure against these shocks depends on how they affect local interest rates. In the United States, most borrowing occurs through the mortgage market and is influenced by the presence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSE). We establish that despite large regional variation in predictable default risk, GSE mortgage rates for otherwise identical loans do not vary spatially. In contrast, the private market does set interest rates which vary with local risk. We use a spatial model of collateralized borrowing to show that the national interest rate policy substantially affects welfare by redistributing resources across regions. (JEL E32, E43, G21, G28, L32, R11, R31)

We use credit report data to study consumer financial distress in America. We report large, persistent disparities in financial distress across regions. To understand these patterns, we conduct a “movers” analysis. For collections and default, there is only weak convergence following a move, suggesting these types of distress are not primarily caused by place-based factors (e.g., local economic conditions and state laws) but instead reflect person-based characteristics (e.g., financial literacy and risk preferences). In contrast, for personal bankruptcy, we find a sizable place-based effect, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence on how local legal factors influence personal bankruptcy.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.