Abstract The more trust investors place in a money manager, the more confident they are to take risk. We test this theory in a laboratory experiment using the amount returned from a trust game as measure of trustworthiness. Investors increase the share invested in risky assets with high-cost money managers compared to those with low costs when the high-cost money managers are more trustworthy than the low-cost ones. The willingness to take more risk with high-cost money managers is increasing in the difference in trustworthiness. Up to a third of the difference in trustworthiness translates into an increasing risky share. Vice versa, investors are willing to accept higher costs for investments made through more trustworthy money managers. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, demonstrating that the risk-aversion channel can be sufficient for trust to influence behavior.

Abstract Using data from a large German brokerage, we find that individuals investing in passive exchange-traded funds (ETFs) do not improve their portfolio performance, even before transaction costs. Further analysis suggests that this is because of poor ETF timing as well as poor ETF selection (relative to the choice of low-cost, well-diversified ETFs). An exploration of investor heterogeneity shows that though investors who trade more have worse ETF timing, no groups of investors benefit by using ETFs, and no groups will lose by investing in low-cost, well-diversified ETFs.

We examine how adverse local experiences that are uninformative of future returns affect households’ investment behavior in the short term. Using data from a German online brokerage and a survey, we show that retail investors sharply reduce risk taking in response to nearby firm bankruptcies. Adjustments in risk taking occur through immediate and transitory increases in trading, and work through more pessimistic expectations about aggregate stock returns and increased risk aversion. Changes in background risks or wealth effects cannot explain our findings. Extrapolation from local experiences to aggregate expectations is inconsistent with optimal use of full or limited information.

Working with one of the largest brokerages in Germany, we record what happens when unbiased investment advice is offered to a random set of approximately 8,000 active retail customers out of the brokerage's several hundred thousand retail customers. We find that investors who most need the financial advice are least likely to obtain it. The investors who do obtain the advice (about 5%), however, hardly follow the advice and do not improve their portfolio efficiency by much. Overall, our results imply that the mere availability of unbiased financial advice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for benefiting retail investors.