This paper investigates how the 2008–2009 financial crisis affected the value of diversification in different regions of the world, thereby emphasizing the role of the institutional context. We show that the effect of the credit crunch upon the diversification discount varied with the regions' level of capital market maturity and legal environment. In developed Asia Pacific, the British Isles, and North America, we find that the discount on conglomerates fell significantly during the crisis years; however, in Continental Europe – the region possessing the least developed capital markets and lowest legal investor protection in our sample – the impact of the financial meltdown upon the relative value of diversified firms was insignificant. Our study provides additional evidence on factors influencing the relative costs and benefits of diversified firms and highlights in particular the importance of accounting for different institutional settings.

The Berger and Ofek (1995) excess value measure, comparing a conglomerate’s actual market value to an imputed value based on standalones, has become the standard method to determine value effects of diversification. In this paper, we address a significant bias in this procedure stemming from the difference in cash holdings between diversified and standalone firms. Excess values are based on firm values, including corporate cash positions. As standalones hold significantly more cash, the imputed cash value is higher than the conglomerate’s actual cash value, resulting in a downward biased excess value. We thus propose to calculate excess values based on enterprise values, replacing total debt by net debt. Based on an extensive US sample, we show that there is significantly less evidence of a diversification discount when adjusting for the cash bias. In terms of average dollar losses, the firm value-based models overestimate the conglomerate discount by at least 25%. Apart from removing the cash bias, we propose a second modification to the excess value measure, arguing that standalone industry multipliers should be calculated using geometric mean aggregation instead of median aggregation.

This paper investigates inorganic growth strategies in PE buyouts where the portfolio firm, which has been acquired in the initial buyout, serves as a platform for subsequent add-on acquisitions. We analyze a comprehensive sample of 9548 buyouts and 4937 add-on acquisitions spanning 16years of buyout activity in 86 countries. We find that the probability for add-on acquisitions is high if the PE sponsor is experienced and has reputational capital, if the portfolio firm is large, has M&A experience at entry and operates in an industry with moderate degree of fragmentation, as well as in case of favorable financing conditions. Similar factors also explain higher add-on productivity and faster add-on execution. On average, cross-border/industry diversifying inorganic growth strategies are most likely if the portfolio company already draws upon international/inter-industrial M&A experience at entry and if the PE sponsor frequently invests across borders/industries. Furthermore, our results indicate that add-on acquisitions increase the probability for exiting through IPO and secondary buyout. The effect on secondary buyouts is driven by deals where the subsequent PE owner continues the inorganic growth strategy of the previous buyout.