This paper examines whether investor sentiment about the stock market affects prices of the S&P 500 options. The findings reveal that the index option volatility smile is steeper (flatter) and the risk-neutral skewness of monthly index return is more (less) negative when market sentiment becomes more bearish (bullish). These significant relations are robust and become stronger when there are more impediments to arbitrage in index options. They cannot be explained by rational perfect-market-based option pricing models. Changes in investor sentiment help explain time variation in the slope of index option smile and risk-neutral skewness beyond factors suggested by the current models. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

ABSTRACT I develop an interest rate model with separate factors driving innovations in bond yields and their covariances. It features a flexible and tractable affine structure for bond covariances. Maximum likelihood estimation of the model with panel data on swaptions and discount bonds implies pricing errors for swaptions that are almost always lower than half of the bid–ask spread. Furthermore, market prices of interest rate caps do not deviate significantly from their no‐arbitrage values implied by the swaptions under the model. These findings support the conjectures of Collin‐Dufresne and Goldstein (2003) , Dai and Singleton (2003) , and Jagnnathan, Kaplin, and Sun (2003) .

Abstract We show theoretically and empirically that the cross-section of stock return idiosyncratic volatilities contains useful information about the ICAPM. We construct a proxy cross-sectional bivariate idiosyncratic volatility (CBIV) for the covariance risk between the market and the unobserved hedge portfolio under the ICAPM. Consistent with the ICAPM pricing relation, CBIV is a robust and significant predictor of the equity risk premium. We further show that the return predictability of the tail index in Kelly and Jiang (2014) can be explained by the ICAPM covariance risk.

We analyze capital allocation in a conglomerate where divisional managers with uncertain abilities compete for promotion to CEO. A manager can sometimes gain by unobservably adding variance to divisional performance. Capital rationing can limit this distortion, increase productive efficiency, and allow the owner to make more accurate promotion decisions. Firms for which CEO talent is more important for firm performance are more likely to ration capital. A rationed manager is more likely to be promoted even though all managers are identical ex ante. When the tournament payoff is relatively small, offering an incentive wage can be more efficient than rationing capital; however, when tournament incentives are paramount, rationing is more efficient.

We explore the link between credit and equity markets by considering the informational content of the term structure of credit spreads. A shallower credit term structure predicts decreases in default risk and increases in future profitability, as well as favorable earnings surprises. Further, the slope of the credit term structure negatively predicts future stock returns. While systematic slope risk is priced, information diffusion from the credit market to equities, particularly in less visible stocks, plays an additional role in accounting for return predictability from credit slopes. That is, such predictability is less evident in stocks with high institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and liquidity, and vice versa.