This study analyzes the effect of second-hand information on the behavior of security prices and volume using analysts' recommendations published in the monthly “Dartboard” column of the Wall Street Journal. For the two days following the publication of the recommendations, average positive abnormal returns of 4 percent—nearly twice the level of abnormal returns documented in previous research on analyst recommendations—and average volume double normal volume levels on the two days following publication of the recommendations are documented. The positive abnormal return on announcement is partially reversed within 25 trading days. The authors conclude that the positive abnormal return on announcement of the recommendations is a result of naive buying pressure as well as the information content of the analysts' recommendations.

General partners (GPs) in private equity (PE) report the performance of an existing fund while raising capital for a follow-on fund. Interim performance has large effects on fundraising outcomes. The impact is greatest when backed by exits and for low reputation GPs. Faced with these incentives, GPs time their fundraising to coincide with periods of peak performance through two strategies: (1) exit and fundraise and (2) net asset value (NAV) management. Consistent with the former, performance peaks are greatest for funds with high realization rates. Consistent with the latter, low reputation GPs with low realization rates experience performance peaks and erosions in performance after fundraising.

We analyze the empirical power and specification of test statistics in event studies designed to detect long-run (one- to five-year) abnormal stock returns. We document that test statistics based on abnormal returns calculated using a reference portfolio, such as a market index, are misspecified (empirical rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection rates) and identify three reasons for this misspecification. We correct for the three identified sources of misspecification by matching sample firms to control firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios. This control firm approach yields well-specified test statistics in virtually all sampling situations considered.

This research evaluates methods used in event studies that employ accounting-based measures of operating performance. We examine the choice of an accounting-based performance measure, a statistical test, and a model of expected operating performance. We document the impact of these choices on the test statistics designed to detect abnormal operating performance. We find that commonly used research designs yield test statistics that are misspecified in cases where sample firms have performed either unusually well or poorly. In this sampling situation, the test statistics are only well specified when sample firms are matched to control firms of similar pre-event performance.

We show that investors derive nonpecuniary utility from investing in dual-objective Venture Capital (VC) funds, thus sacrificing returns. Impact funds earn 4.7 percentage points (ppts) lower internal rates of return (IRRs) ex-post than traditional VC funds. In random utility/willingness-to-pay (WTP) models investors accept 2.5–3.7 ppts lower IRRs ex ante for impact funds. The positive WTP result is robust to fund access rationing and investor heterogeneity in fund expected returns. Development organizations, foundations, financial institutions, public pensions, Europeans, and United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment signatories have high WTP. Investors with mission objectives and/or facing political pressure exhibit high WTP; those subject to legal restrictions (e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act) exhibit low WTP.

Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns for nonfinancial firms. Because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns, Fama and French exclude from their analysis financial firms, thus creating a natural holdout sample on which to test the robustness of their results. We document that the relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns is similar for financial and nonfinancial firms. In addition, we present evidence that survivorship bias does not significantly affect the estimated size or book-to-market premiums in returns. Our results indicate data-snooping and selection biases do not explain the size and book-to-market patterns in returns.

We test and confirm the hypothesis that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks experiencing high abnormal trading volume, and stocks with extreme one-day returns. Attention-driven buying results from the difficulty that investors have searching the thousands of stocks they can potentially buy. Individual investors do not face the same search problem when selling because they tend to sell only stocks they already own. We hypothesize that many investors consider purchasing only stocks that have first caught their attention. Thus, preferences determine choices after attention has determined the choice set.

We analyze 1,607 investors who switched from phone-based to online trading during the 1990s. Those who switch to online trading perform well prior to going online, beating the market by more than 2% annually. After going online, they trade more actively, more speculatively, and less profitably than before—lagging the market by more than 3% annually. Reductions in market frictions (lower trading costs, improved execution speed, and greater ease of access) do not explain these findings. Overconfidence—augmented by self-attribution bias and the illusions of knowledge and control—can explain the increase in trading and reduction in performance of online investors.

We analyze tests for long‐run abnormal returns and document that two approaches yield well‐specified test statistics in random samples. The first uses a traditional event study framework and buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns calculated using carefully constructed reference portfolios. Inference is based on either a skewness‐adjusted t ‐statistic or the empirically generated distribution of long‐run abnormal returns. The second approach is based on calculation of mean monthly abnormal returns using calendar‐time portfolios and a time‐series t ‐statistic. Though both approaches perform well in random samples, misspecification in nonrandom samples is pervasive. Thus, analysis of long‐run abnormal returns is treacherous.

Can the freedom to choose how retirement funds are invested leave workers worse off? Via simulation, we document that choice in stock v. bond allocation and type of equity investments in private accounts leads to lower utility and greater risk of income shortfalls relative to private accounts without choice. We also compare private account outcomes to currently promised Social Security benefits to demonstrate that a representative worker (an average wage earner) benefits more from private-account alternatives—with or without choice—than do most workers. Thus, representative worker outcome should not be used to assess population-wide benefits of private account alternatives.