Brent W. Ambrose, William L. Megginson, The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 575-589

The US tax system allows taxpayers to deduct local taxes from their taxable incomes. Using school district referendum results, we employ a continuous treatment two-way fixed-effects framework to provide causal evidence of a positive relation between the demand for local public goods and the share of residents deducting local taxes. We find that a 1 percentage point decrease in the share of residents deducting property taxes reduces tax and bond referendum approval rates by approximately 0.97 percentage points. Because these federal tax deductions disproportionately benefit higher-income individuals, they potentially widen disparities in public service provision across jurisdictions.

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.

This paper examines the effect of a regulatory action (the Home Valuation Code of Conduct) that was designed to reduce the incidence of inflated collateral valuations. We identify the impact of the regulation using a difference-in-difference identification strategy. Our baseline results confirm that the regulation reduced inflated valuations in refinance transactions by 16% in the large lender sample, compared to small lenders and a placebo sample. The effect is most significant in low-liquidity and low-distress markets, but not in other markets. We find that the regulation had a significant impact on loan to value ratio and interest rate, and it also led to a significant increase in defaults but a decrease in prepayments.

This paper focuses on the defaultable lease rate term structure with endogenous default. We combine the competitive lease market argument proposed by Grenadier (1996) and the endogenous default structural model proposed by Leland and Toft (1996) to examine the interaction between the lessee’s capital structure and the equilibrium lease rate. Under this framework, determining the lease rate is a simultaneous equation problem that captures the trade-off between debt and lease financing. Using data on 2,482 real estate lease transactions, we empirically confirm the predictions derived from the numerical analysis of the model.

We test for pricing disparities in mortgage contracts using a novel data set that allows us to observe the race and ethnicity of both parties to the loan. We find that minorities pay between 3% and 5% more in fees than similarly qualified whites when obtaining a loan through the same white broker. Critically, we find that the premium paid by minorities depends on the race of the broker. We also examine recent policy changes around broker compensation rules that may not only reduce these price disparities but may also limit access to credit for minorities.

We employ a weighted repeat rent estimator to construct quarterly indexes that expand the profession’s ability to make cross-sectional comparisons of housing markets. Our analysis shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in the behavior of rents across cities over the 2000–2010 decade, but the number of cities and years for which nominal rents fell is substantial; rents fell in many cities following the onset of the housing crisis in 2007; and the repeat rent and Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes differ due to sampling and construction methods.

We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with “low‐doc” mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to. We provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income. Our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low‐doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self‐employed borrowers.