This paper develops a new model for studying multiechelon inventory systems with stochastic demand. For the model we assume that each site in the system orders at preset times according to an order-up-to policy, that delivery times are deterministic, and that the demand processes are stochastic with independent increments. We introduce a new scheme for allocating stock in short supply, which we call virtual allocation and which permits significant tractability. We exercise the model on a set of test problems for two-echelon systems to get insight into the structure of good policies. The primary findings are that both the central warehouse (upper echelon) and the retail sites (lower echelon) should hold safety stock, but that most of the safety stock should be at the retail sites. Consequently, the central warehouse will stock out with high probability. Furthermore, we show that the virtual allocation rule is near optimal for the set of test problems.

The Pure Expectations Hypothesis (PEH) serves as the benchmark model for the relationship between yields on bonds of different maturities. When coupled with rational expectations, however, empirical renderings of the model fail miserably. I explore the possibility that failure to account for changes in monetary policy regime explains much of the failure of the PEH. Estimating changing monetary regimes in conjunction with the PEH significantly improves its performance. The predicted spread between the long and short rates is highly correlated with the actual spread. The standard deviation of the theoretical spread is nearly identical to that of the actual spread.

Top management teams make strategic decisions, and the products of their decision making influence organizational performance. However, a subtle paradox is embedded in this relationship. This study focuses on conflict as the crux of this paradox and provides evidence from two different samples of conflict's consistent yet contradictory effects on decision quality, consensus, and affective acceptance.

Organizations, like sponges, must have the capacity to absorb inputs in order to generate outputs. Researchers have developed theories of organizational absorptive capacity; researchers have also developed models of the effective generation of new products. The challenge lies in integrating the two research streams.

We use futures transaction data to investigate cross-sectional relationships between market-maker inventory positions and trade activity. The investigation documents strongly that traders control inventory throughout the trading day. Despite this evidence of inventory management, typical inventory control models are contradicted by our data. These inventory models predict that market-maker reservation prices are negatively influenced by inventory. Surprisingly, our evidence shows, as a strong and consistent empirical regularity, that correlations between inventory and reservation prices are positive. We interpret the evidence as consistent with active position taking by futures market floor traders.

Royston Greenwood, C. R. Hinings, Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing together the Old and the New Institutionalism, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 1022-1054

Investment is characterized by costly reversibility when a firm can purchase capital at a given price and sell capital at a lower price. We solve for the optimal investment of a firm that faces costly reversibility under uncertainty and we extend the Jorgensonian concept of the user cost of capital to this case. We define and calculate cU and cL as the user costs of capital associated with the purchase and sale of capital, respectively. Optimality requires the firm to purchase and sell capital as needed to keep the marginal revenue product of capital in the closed interval [cL, cU). This prescription encompasses the case of irreversible investment as well as the standard neoclassical case of costlessly reversible investment.

We use data from the Canadian 2-year longitudinal Labour Market Activity Survey of 1986-87 to estimate the effect of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system on job duration. Particular attention is focused on the "entrance requirements" of the UI system, which relate eligibility for UI benefits to an individual's recent employment history. The article makes operational the UI entrance requirement provisions which take into account variations in the regional unemployment rate. Controlling for many personal and job characteristics, we find evidence that a significant number of jobs terminate when they have reached the duration that would permit a UI claim.

This paper develops a resource-based—knowledge-based—theory of the firm. Its thesis is that the organizational mode through which individuals cooperate affects the knowledge they apply to business activity. We focus on the polar cases of organization within a firm as compared to market contracting. There will be a difference in the knowledge that is brought to bear, and hence in joint productivity, under the two options. Thus, as compared to opportunism-based, transaction-cost theory, we advance a separate (yet complementary) answer to the question: why do firms exist? Our aim is to develop an empirically relevant and complementary theory of why firms are formed: a theory based on irreducible knowledge differences between individuals rather than the threat of purposeful cheating or withholding of information. We assume limited cognitive abilities on the part of individuals (bounded rationality), and assume that opportunistic behavior will not occur. The latter allows us to determine whether resource-based theory has independent force, as compared to the opportunism-based, transaction-cost approach. The paper predicts choice of organizational mode, identifying whether firm organization or market contracting will result in the more valuable knowledge being applied to business activity. The resource-based predictions of organizational mode are compared and contrasted with corresponding opportunism-based, transaction-cost ones. A principal point is that knowledge-based considerations can outweigh opportunism-related ones. The paper also establishes the relation of a theory of the firm to a theory of performance differences between competing firms.