This essay examines interconnections between "race" and economic inequality in the United States, focusing on the case of African-Americans. I will argue that it is crucially important to distinguish between racial discrimination and racial stigma in the study of this problem. Racial discrimination has to do with how blacks are treated, while racial stigma is concerned with how black people are perceived. My view is that what I call reward bias (unfair treatment of persons in formal economic transactions based on racial identity) is now a less significant barrier to the full participation by African-Americans in U.S. society than is what I will call development bias (blocked access to resources critical for personal development but available only via non-market-mediated social transactions). By making these points in the specific cultural and historical context of the black experience in U.S. society, I hope to contribute to a deeper conceptualization of the worldwide problem of race and economic marginality.

We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.

This study shows that the strategies of service firms affect the uncertainty they encounter in their dealings with customers. This strategically induced uncertainty then becomes the mechanism by which service firms organize their production processes. In a study of 234 service firms representing 96 different industries, we found strong support for relationships between these organizations' strategies and the level of complexity in their production processes. In addition, service firms that possessed the hypothesized fit between strategy and service production complexity tended to experience higher performance.

The theory of involuntary international transfers (war indemnities) has been constructed on the assumption that the donor and recipient are completely indifferent to each other’s well‐being. The assumption is hard to justify since usually the transfers closely follow periods during which the countries have been dropping bombs on each other. In the present paper, we rework the theory on the more plausible assumption that the well‐being of each country is negatively influenced by the well‐being of the other country. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional theory, the donor might benefit at the expense of the recipient, even when local Walrasian stability is imposed.

We value a firm that pays its cash flows to equity through share repurchases in a dynamic environment where personal taxes are paid on capital gains upon realization. The cost of capital is reduced by approximately 0.8% through the use of repurchases relative to dividends. We use the empirical distribution of pre-tax free cash flows in Fama and French (1999) to evaluate the tradeoffs between the costs of financial distress, the personal-tax advantages of equity, and the corporate-tax advantage to debt. The optimal capital structure is interior with a 3% bankruptcy cost.

Since the publication (1976) of the classic Lucas critique, researchers in empirical macroeconomics have endeavored to specify models that capture the underlying dynamic decision-making behavior of consumers and firms who require forecasts of future events. Recently, a number of researchers have developed simple models that have become the workhorses for monetary policy analysis. The models vary considerably with regard to optimizing foundations and explicit treatment of expectations. However, relatively little effort has been devoted to testing the empirical importance of the Lucas critique for these simple models. Can one find specifications that are policy-invariant? This paper develops and implements a set of tests for several monetary policy models used extensively in the literature. In particular, we attempt to test the robustness of optimizing versus nonoptimizing models to changes in the monetary policy regime. We present evidence that shows that some forward-looking models from the recent literature may be less stable than their better-fitting backward-looking counterparts.

Much literature before and after the privatization of Mexico's commercial banking system in 1991–1992 argued that the system was collusive and noncompetitive and would likely continue to be for years. Banks would collude to underloan so that – at least in comparison with what would happen in a competitive system – they could overcharge. Because a parallel literature on lending after bank privatization suggests that the problem is often not too little, but too much, we resolved to test for competitive behavior in the Mexican banking system. Using an empirical approach developed by Shaffer (Econom. Lett. 29 (1989) 321, J. Money Credit Bank. 25 (1993) 49, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working paper no. 93-28R), we find a structural break in the middle of the privatization period that signals the start of an episode of what Shaffer calls “supercompetitive” behavior. In such a supercompetition, banks run at levels of output where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. This behavior is consistent with a struggle in which banks take losses now because they think the market share they get in the bargain offers a positive present value of expected future return. The behavior can also be consistent with just the sort of banking crises that ensued in Mexico.

Historically, the average return on S&P stocks has far exceeded the average return on short-term U.S. government debt. Rajnish Mehra and Prescott (1985), for example, found that the average difference was 6.2 percent per year in the 1889–1978 period. They tried to account for this difference by assuming it is a premium for bearing nondiversi � able aggregate risk but found that risk accounted for only a tiny fraction of the difference. They concluded that there is an “equity premium puzzle.” Here, we reexamine this puzzle, taking into account some factors ignored by Mehra and Prescott (taxes, regulatory constraints, and diversi� cation costs) and focusing on long-term

Many clinics that offer in vitro fertilization (IVF) have begun to market the following options to couples: (1) an a la carte program where the couple pays $7,500 per attempt regardless of the outcome; or (2) a money-back-guarantee program where the couple pays a $15,000 fee that covers up to three attempts, however, if after three cycles there is no live-birth delivery, then the full $15,000 is refunded. We assess the a la carte versus the money-back-guarantee programs, and find the surprising result that the money-back-guarantee program appears (for the patients) to be “too good to be true.” That is, the money-back guarantee yields a substantial negative expected profit per couple for the clinics. More importantly from the patients' perspective, the money-back guarantee is the better option for all couples with less than 0.5 success probability per cycle. Virtually all traditional IVF patients have had per-cycle success probabilities below 0.5. A detailed analysis of the key variables—i.e., success rate per attempt, heterogeneity of couples' rates of success, individual couples' “learning” on successive attempts, and cost to the clinic per attempt—shows that these money-back guarantees are unprofitable for the clinics. Since presumably clinics are not in business to lose money, the standard analysis must be missing something major. We suggest that the marketing of money-back guarantees is inducing couples who would previously have used—successfully—other less invasive procedures with fewer side effects and less risk of multiple births to decide to proceed directly to IVF, and that this scenario makes the money-back guarantees profitable for the clinics. The implications of earlier use of IVF are then considered from an overall public policy point of view. Just as mothers everywhere tell their children, “When something looks too good to be true, then it is too good to be true!”