This paper investigates the effects of pre‐IPO banking relationships on a firm's IPO. Using a new and unique data set, which compares the firm's pre‐IPO banking relationships to the underwriters managing the firm's new issue, I test whether banking relationships established before the firm's IPO ameliorate asymmetric informa tion problems behind high IPO underpricing. The results show that firms with a pre‐IPO banking relationship with a prospective underwriter face about 17% lower underpricing than firms without such banking relationships. These results are robust to controlling for the firm's endogenous selection of the pre‐IPO banking institution.

We examine the long-term return performance of U.S. IPOs underwritten by relationship banks. We show that, over one- to three-year horizons, IPOs managed by relationship banks experience buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns that are similar to those observed for a matching sample of stocks managed by non-relationship underwriters. This result holds even when the returns' skewness and cross-sectional correlation is accounted for. Further, we examine the calendar-time returns on a portfolio that is long the stocks underwritten by relationship banks and short ex-ante similar stocks taken public by non-relationship institutions. Again, we conclude that the two groups of IPOs yield similar long-run returns. These findings support the certification role of relationship banks and suggest that, in this respect, the effect of the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act has not been negative.

We examine how performance changes at airlines in response to a change in executive incentives. Airlines with executive bonuses contingent on on-time arrival do improve on-time performance. We find evidence of strategic gaming of the incentive as some carriers increase scheduled flight times, making it easier for flights to arrive on time. This effect is more pronounced for competitive routes. Carriers also do not decrease the frequency of flights or the number of passengers to make it easier to be on time, but they do slightly decrease fares. Competitors on the same routes also improve their on-time performance, even when their executive bonuses are not contingent on on-time performance, consistent with competition in strategic complements. (JEL G30, G34, G32) Received February 5, 2018; editorial decision April 3, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

We use data from the US airline industry to investigate whether firms that are under bankruptcy protection, as well as these firm's product market rivals, change the quality of the products they offer. We measure the quality of the services offered by a carrier using flight cancelations and delays, and the age of the aircraft used by the carrier. We find that delays and cancelations are less frequent during bankruptcy filings but return to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the bankrupt firm emerges from bankruptcy. We also find that firms use Chapter 11 filings to permanently reduce the age of their fleet. We do not find evidence of statistically and economically significant changes by the airline's competitors along any of the dimensions above.