This study investigates how the political connections of government bank CEOs affected their banks’ performance during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Examination of global data shows that government banks with politically connected CEOs experienced significantly higher loan default rates and worse operating performance during the crisis than those without politically connected CEOs. However, these politically connected CEOs were less likely than others to be penalized for the poor performance of their banks. Our evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs of government banks can influence a bank’s lending decisions by using their political power and influence to relax lending standards and to reap private benefits that thus raise their banks’ sensitivity to a crisis.

Using hand-collected data, we find residual state ownership is negatively related to stock return volatility, following China's secondary privatization initiated by the non-tradable share reform. Conservative corporate policies are channels through which residual state ownership reduces stock return volatility. Further, the volatility-mitigating effect is more prevalent in firms in which the government has greater influence on corporate decisions. However, the volatility-mitigating effect is temporary, lasting up to three years after state shares become fully tradable. The evidence suggests the government can send credible signals by retaining state ownership, which reduces investor uncertainty. However, investors must weigh the positive signaling effect of residual state ownership in reducing uncertainty, surrounding sudden policy changes, against the inefficiencies of state control.