We investigate how changes in the availability of bank credit influence how public firms manage their working capital, which is essential to their operations. In doing so, we provide an enhanced understanding of what significantly influences corporate working capital management. We find that changes in the availability of bank credit significantly influence a number of aspects of a firm's working capital policies, and these effects often differ across firms that are more or less dependent on bank financing. Interestingly, our evidence points to the importance of the changing mix of U.S. companies for working capital practices.

We examine how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), jointly with influential institutional ownership (IO), affects firm value around the 2008 global financial crisis. We find that the effect of CSR on firm value varies with the level of influential institutional ownership and depends upon economic conditions. Using difference-in-difference methods, we show that compared with non-CSR firms, CSR firms have higher firm values before the financial crisis but experience more loss in firm value during the crisis. Our findings suggest that the overall CSR effect depends on the relative dominance of two effects: conflict-resolution and overinvestment effect. In addition, we apply triple difference analysis and show that the relation between CSR and firm value depends upon the level of influential institutional ownership. Specifically, before the crisis, CSR positively affects the value of low institutional ownership firms and the effect is significantly weaker for firms with higher influential IO. During the crisis, the CSR-firm value relation is positive for high institutional ownership firms, suggesting that overinvestment concerns dominate when the crisis occurs. However, such a positive IO effect is not significant for CSR firms with high rollover risks. Our results are supported by a series of robustness tests.

We argue that reductions in shareholder taxes should lower the cost of equity capital more for financially constrained firms than for other companies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that, following the 1997 (TRA) and the 2003 (JGTRRA) cuts in U.S. individual shareholder taxes, financially constrained firms enjoyed larger reductions in their cost of equity capital than did other firms. The results are consistent with the incidence of the tax reductions falling mostly on firms with both pressing needs for capital and disproportionate ownership by individuals, the only shareholders who benefited from the legislations. The paper provides a partial explanation for the seemingly puzzling finding that, following the unprecedented 2003 reduction in dividend tax rates, non-dividend-paying firms outperformed dividend-paying firms. The results suggest that it was not dividend status that mattered, but financial constraint, a common attribute of non-dividend-paying companies. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.