Steven B. Caudill, Richard W. Ault, and Richard P. Saba (1989) introduce an approach to estimating a hedonic price equation that accounts for censoring d ue to rent control in a rental housing market. This paper extends and clarifies their assertion on the consistency of the ordinary least squares estimates and their estimates. The authors indicate how the nature of the rent control law affects the consistency propertie s of the two estimation methods. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

It is widely believed that rent control leads to a decline in the quality of rental housing. This study examines the effect of rent control on the quality of rental housing in New York City. Quality change is linked to the suppression of rent below market levels and other characteristics of the housing unit. We develop a first-order nonstationary, heterogeneous Markov model that allows for true state dependence, observed heterogeneity, nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity, and a mover-stayer structure. The results offer some support for the belief that rent control leads to a deterioration in housing quality but suggest the need for additional investigation of this issue.

The major emphasis in previous money demand studies has been at the aggregate level, with little systematic attention paid to sectoral differences in money holding behavior. This paper attempts to address the latter issue by focusing on more homogeneous subgroups to gauge money holding patterns. We apply cointegration theory to identify long-run money demand functions for the household and business sectors of the U.S. economy. In general, our results, which are based on the 1960-1990 U.S. monetary experience, suggest substantial sectoral divergences in long-run relationships. In particular, the household sector reveals more stable relationships. The business sector indicates strong interest elasticities, which are found to be negligible for the household case. These findings are invariant to alternative money definitions and for different sample periods. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders’ value if managers do not sacrifice value to build empires. We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at US bank holding companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. At banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions and sales are associated with improved performance. At banks with entrenched management, sales are related to smaller improvements while acquisitions are associated with worse performance. Consistent with scale economies, an increase in assets by internal growth is associated with better performance at most banks.