The effect of disclosure level on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to the financial reporting community. However, the association between disclosure level and cost of equity capital is not well established and has been difficult to quantify. In this paper I examine the association between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital by regressing firm-specific estimates of cost of equity capital on market beta, firm size and a self-constructed measure of disclosure level. My measure of disclosure level is based on the amount of voluntary disclosure provided in the 1990 annual reports of a sample of 122 manufacturing firms. For firms that attract a low analyst following, the results indicate that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital. The magnitude of the effect is such that a one-unit difference in the disclosure measure is associated with a difference of approximately twenty-eight basis points in the cost of equity capital, after controlling for market beta and firm size. For firms with a high analyst following, however, I find no evidence of an association between my measure of disclosure level and cost of equity capital perhaps because the disclosure measure is limited to the annual report and accordingly may not provide a powerful proxy for overall disclosure level when analysts play a significant role in the communication process.
Christine A. Botosan, Mary S. Harris, Motivations for a Change in Disclosure Frequency and Its Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly Segment Disclosures, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 329-353
Using retroactive disclosures required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131, we examine managers' incentives for withholding segment information under SFAS No. 14 and the impact of SFAS No. 131 on analysts' information environment for a sample of firms that previously reported as single-segment firms and initiated segment disclosure with SFAS No. 131. We examine this set of firms because they likely had the strongest incentives to withhold segment information and analysts potentially had the most to gain when these firms were forced to begin providing segment disclosures under SFAS No. 131. We find that these firms used the latitude in SFAS No. 14 to hide profitable segments operating in less competitive industries than their primary operations. However, we find no evidence to suggest that these firms used the latitude in SFAS No. 14 to mask poor performance. In contrast, our results suggest that by withholding segment information, these firms allowed themselves to appear as if they were underperforming their competition when this was not the case. Thus, their decision to withhold segment disclosures under SFAS No. 14 appears to be motivated by a desire to protect profits in less competitive industries. In terms of the impact of SFAS No. 131 on analysts' information environment, our evidence suggests that SFAS No. 131 increased analysts' reliance on public data, but we provide weak evidence to suggest that this shift may have come at the cost of a marginal increase in overall uncertainty and squared error in the mean forecast.
Managers, investors, and researchers have a compelling interest in identifying a reliable empirical proxy for firm-specific cost of equity capital (r). In theory, deducing r is possible if the market's future cash flow forecast and current stock price are observable. Practically, deducing r is dependent on the ability to estimate the market's forecasted terminal value. We evaluate five methods of deducing firm-specific r (labeled rDIVPREM, rGLSPREM, rGORPREM, rOJNPREM, and rPEGPREM) that deal with this conundrum differently. The extent to which the estimates are associated with firm risk in a stable and meaningful manner is the basis for our assessment. We find that the rDIVPREM and rPEGPREM estimates are consistently and predictably related to risk, while the alternatives are not. Based on these results, we conclude that rDIVPREM and rPEGPREM dominate the alternatives.