We investigate the effects of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEO's annual bonus. After controlling for the general pay-for-performance relation, we find a significant incremental adverse effect on CEO annual cash bonuses when the firm's quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst forecast or the earnings for the same quarter of the prior year, for at least two quarters during the year. However, we find that the relation between the bonus and the number of loss quarters is not significant. Our results suggest that CEO bonus payments provide CEOs with economic incentives to meet quarterly analyst earnings forecasts and earnings from the same quarter of the prior year.

Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm's value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm's earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior to the forecast issuance decision. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm's historic ERC is positively associated with management's issuance of earnings forecasts.

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is likely to improve boards of director's ability to identify unfit CEOs, and competition is likely to enhance the usefulness of RPE. Consistent with our hypotheses, the frequency of CEO turnover is greater in highly competitive industries than in less competitive industries. We also find that RPE-based (firm-specific) accounting measures are more closely associated with CEO turnover in high (low) competition industries than in low (high) competition industries. These findings suggest that the lack of support for RPE in prior studies results from not considering the effects of competition.

Recent theory argues that concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to smooth earnings in consideration of both current and future relative performance. We find support for this theory. Our evidence suggests that when current earnings are ‘poor’ and expected future earnings are ‘good’, managers ‘borrow’ earnings from the future for use in the current period. Conversely, when current earnings are ‘good’ and expected future earnings are ‘poor’ managers ‘save’ current earnings for possible use in the future. However, sensitivity analysis indicates that we cannot rule out selection bias as a potential alternative explanation for our findings.

We study whether bestowing chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairman duties on one individual affects a boards decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman duties are vested in the same individual. These results are consistent with the view that the lack of independent leadership in firms that combine the CEO and Chairman positions makes it difficult for the board to remove poorly performing managers.

If the market anticipates the reversing nature of abnormal working capital accruals, then the reported magnitude of earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals will differ from the underlying magnitude that is priced by the market. We expect the market's perception of this difference to affect the ERCs associated with earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals. We test our predictions using an abnormal accruals measure that captures the difference between reported working capital and a proxy for the market's expectations of the level of working capital required to support current sales levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find higher ERCs when abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of earnings surprises, and lower ERCs when abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of earnings surprises. We also find results consistent with analysts predictably considering the reversing implications of abnormal accruals in revising future earnings forecasts. These findings are consistent with market participants anticipating the reversing implications of abnormal accruals. However, analysis of subsequent stock returns provides evidence that market participants do not fully impound the pricing implications of abnormal accruals at the earnings announcement date.

We investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice—managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future earnings are relatively more uncertain. Specifically, balance sheet disclosures are more likely among firms: (1) in high technology industries; (2) reporting losses; (3) with larger forecast errors; (4) engaging in mergers or acquisitions; (5) that are younger; and (6) with more volatile stock returns. This is consistent with managers disclosing balance sheets in response to investor demand for value relevant information to supplement earnings.

We investigate whether management forecast accuracy provides a signal regarding CEOs' ability to anticipate and respond to future events by examining the relation between management forecast errors and CEO turnover. We find that the probability of CEO turnover is positively related to the magnitude of absolute forecast errors when firm performance is poor and that this positive relation holds for both positive and negative forecast errors. In addition, we find that the positive relation between CEO turnover and the absolute forecast errors is concentrated in the sample of less entrenched CEOs. Our findings indicate that boards of directors use management forecast accuracy as a signal of CEOs' managerial ability and that managers bear a cost for issuing inaccurate forecasts.