It is frequently observed that fraud has a greater economic impact on society than any other category of crime. Arguing that both research and practitioner frameworks in auditing and forensic accounting have tended to adopt an individualizing perspective predicated primarily on solo offending, this article adopts an inductive approach to consider why individuals co‐offend in fraud. It reports the results of a set of interviews with 37 individuals convicted of a range of frauds including financial statement fraud, insider trading, credit card fraud, money laundering, and asset misappropriation. In each instance, the fraud was perpetrated by a group of two or more co‐offenders. Based on inductive, exploratory case coding, we find that reasons for co‐offending vary according to the type of bond that exists between co‐offenders. Two dimensions of fraudulent co‐offending are identified—the primary beneficiary of the fraud and the nature of group attachment—to derive three distinct archetypes of bonds between co‐offenders: (1) individual‐serving functional bonds, (2) organization‐serving functional bonds, and (3) affective bonds. Key elements of each archetype as well as their impact on the decision to co‐offend are examined. Our findings suggest that the social nature of fraud is not merely an incidental feature of the crime but is instead a potential key to understanding its etiology and some of its distinctive features. They also support the need for diagnostic tools to move beyond individualistic analyses of fraud toward a broader, group‐sensitive assessment of fraud risk.

ABTRACT This study investigates the way that experienced audit committee Chairs address barriers to effective performance. We conceptualize audit committees as groups of individuals gathering, elaborating, and sharing information, and identify key group barriers to effective audit committee oversight. Drawing on 24 interviews with audit committee Chairs from leading Australian-listed companies, we provide new evidence of the approaches used in practice to address information-processing barriers faced by audit committees. Specifically, we identify six key mechanisms: (1) audit committee composition; (2) pre-meetings; (3) handling of disagreements between management and auditors; (4) formal audit committee meeting facilitation; (5) promoting audit committee skepticism; and (6) external auditor selection. Our findings provide insights for audit committee members, audit partners, and policy-makers as they aim to improve financial reporting and audit quality. These findings also have important implications for research designs of future experimental research.

ABSTRACT Previous research has highlighted the crucial roles that accounting plays in both the construction and development of the state. However, only limited attention has been paid to how accounting is both conceived and implemented as a technology of government. Taking a historical perspective, and through extensive archival analysis of the Canadian experience, we explore here the ways in which accounting practices were significantly expanded and elaborated over time. Progressively, accounting was successful in increasingly infiltrating the machinery of the state, resulting in greater power and influence being accorded to state accounting professionals. We contribute to existing governmentality research on accounting in two principal ways. First, we demonstrate how the territorializing power of accounting has transnational dimensions. The Canadian initiative was galvanized by simultaneous initiatives taking place in the United Kingdom, the United States, and a range of other Commonwealth nations. The similar trajectories of these various initiatives leads to a view of accounting as something that is co‐constructed across borders, a process we refer to here as transnational territorialization. Second, we demonstrate the crucial role played by key individuals in this transnational territorialization. Auditors general worked both individually and in concert to skillfully sell the evaluative potential of accounting to key power brokers in the state apparatus, thereby creating advantageous positions for themselves. This highlights the crucial role required by skillful and reflexive social agents in the elaboration of accounting technologies, something that hitherto has been underappreciated in extant literature on both auditing and governmentality.