Journal Article The Enterprise under Central Planning Get access R. D. Portes R. D. Portes Balliol College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 2, April 1969, Pages 197–212, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296837 Published: 01 April 1969 Article history Received: 11 September 1967 Revision received: 22 August 1968 Published: 01 April 1969

The Kaldor-Mirrlees model of economic growth (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) seems to contain an inconsistency between the assumption of imperfect competition and the relation it postulates between the wage rate and the marginal productivity of labour.

I. Introduction, 299. — II. Changes in employment patterns, 300. — III. Negro population changes in the urban areas, 304. — IV. A model of decentralization of employment and its impact on the urban negro's employment problem, 304. — V. The regression results, 307. — VI. Conclusions and implications, 309.

D. Levhari, E. Sheshinski; The Relation between the Rate of Return and the Rate of Technical Progress1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 3, 1 Ju

I NTERNATIONAL comparison of trade barriers has always been complicated by the problem that the barriers take different, and not easily comparable forms: tariffs, exchange controls, differential sales taxes on domestic and imported products, explicit commodity quotas, implicit or hidden quotas (in the cases of western state trading and all of the trade conducted by the communist nations), and so forth. In 1958 a distinguished panel of experts headed by Gottfried Haberler [4] suggested that the degree of protection can be very roughly judged by the extent to which the price paid to the producer exceeds the world price for importers. . They were well aware of many of the difficulties of this method such as the effect on both domestic and world prices of the goods in question of subsidies given to both exporters and domestic producers. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe used this technique in 1960 [ 12 ] to study agricultural protection in Western Europe. They also were aware of many of the statistical and methodological pitfalls of this technique and, in particular, called attention to the problems raised by the existence of disequilibrium exchange rates and the levy of tariffs on commodities requiring differential amounts of fabrication in the importer. Several other workers have also found the Gatt approach convenient, e.g., Dardis and Pryor [4, 8]. Pryor, interested in comparing the trade barriers by Eastern and Western Europe, respectively, to the exports of underdeveloped nations as a result of discussions which grew out of UNCTAD I. innovated by adjusting the ratios of domestic to world prices for the fact that the price levels of some nations are biased upward by a relatively large reliance on sales as opposed to income taxation. I point out in this paper two major difficulties with the use of the ratio of domestic to world (or import) price as a proper and unambiguous measure of barrier to imports. The first has to do with problems of defining barrier in view of the several different price ratio-quantity relationships which are possible under differing circumstances and assumptions. Second, the implications for this method of disequilibrium prices and repressed inflation are explored. This is particularly relevant for comparisons involving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe [7] since the economies of these nations have consistently experienced repressed inflation. However, it is also relevant to comparisons which would have included Western Europe after World War II and some of the underdeveloped nations at present.

Thompson's model preserves the existence of many firms producing the collective good by having all firms act under the Cournot-Bertrand convention and by discriminating in price among consumers. This use of the Cournot assumption is clearly at variance with the prior assumption by Thompson that there is perfect knowledge of all market-relevant information . peculiar results of the Thompson model rely on perfect knowledge by producers of consumers' preferences, and upon perfect knowledge by consumers of the intentions of producers to discriminate in price. But perfect knowledge of all market-relevant information evidently excludes knowledge of the fact, by any producer, that he can have all the revenue of the industry at no additional cost simply by reducing his price (s) slightly. This is simply not compatible with perfect competition as usually understood, and has nothing to do with whether or not consumers have an incentive to compete against each other. A new entrant or an existing firm in Thompson's model who accidentally reduces his price will reap great rewards. This could not happen in a perfectly competitive equilibrium. If any firm in Thompson's model reduces its price, a destructive competitive price reduction spiral will ensue, reducing the price to equality with marginal cost, which is zero. This is what perfect competition is all about, and it is very different from the behavior of Thompson's producers, who do not, in fact, compete. Just as the nongovernment allocation of a good requires barriers to competition, price discrimination requires the same. There is nothing in the inherent nature of a good which provides these barriers. As a result, Thompson has to make special assumptions about the nature of competition to get his result. These assumptions are not consistent with perfect competition. I would have no quarrel with Thompson if he had titled his paper The Production of Collective Goods Under a Very Peculiar Kind of Non-Competitive Polipoly, and had deleted all further references to perfect competition. One might still argue, of course, that the model is then void of either practical or theoretical usefulness. On the practical side, I submit that each of the examples cited by Thompson of the (e.g., nongovernment) allocation of a good is a case in which there is either some barrier to competition, or in which some good has been substituted for the collective good. In broadcasting, for example, stations substitute the private good, audience size, for the public good, programming. They sell the good, not the one. No collective good can be privately and competitively produced. Nongovernmental allocation of such a good requires both exclusion devices and barriers to competition. Efficient allocation may require price discrimination.

The article discusses the implications of measurement theory on accounting concept formulation. Measurement is a term of common usage in contemporary accounting literature. However, inclusion of the word in accounting terminology appears to have preceded any thoroughgoing analysis of measurement's essential meaning and corresponding implications to the discipline. The purpose of this article is to analyze some deficiencies in accounting thought inferred by the perception of accounting as an explanatory discipline that utilizes measurement as its primary mode of description. As a corollary objective, these problems will be related to some objectives for future accounting research. Correspondent with this objective is the responsibility of accountants, in both research and practice, for the explanatory significance of the numbers and statements issuing from accounting procedures. Accounting research literature is replete with alternative formulations of specific accounting concepts or percepts. On the other hand, analytical research at the metatheoretical level of definitional problems in accounting is virtually non-existent.

The purpose of this article is to present an example of a discussion concerning the accounting model in terms of a computer environment. The instructor of accounting or data processing gets an opportunity to introduce, review or reinforce the student's understanding and use of the accounting model by way of using the model as a means of exploring the computer processing of one and two-dimensional arrays and the use of subroutine subprograms if a course in computers and electronic data processing is included in the business curriculum. This opportunity is especially significant in view of the fact that the curriculum in the college of business is often viewed by the student as a series of unrelated and isolated topics. Certainly, the realities of the situation would suggest that computers and accounting should be discussed simultaneously and not as two separate and distinct subject matters. Students who have already studied the accounting model might benefit from the review that the discussion provides through an alternative means of viewing the debit and credit structure.

The article reports on Accrued expense tax reform. The accounting profession was not ready in 1954 to govern its own conduct and had no effective means to re strain its clients, especially with regard to estimated expenses. Consequently, the opportunity to conform tax accounting more closely with general accounting was missed. Taxpayers and accountants over the years have kept the accrued expense and deferred income issues alive. There have been frequent court cases for individual items. Recently the American Institute of CPA's Committee on Federal Taxation formally revived these issues by including proposals for reenactment of Sections 432 and 462 in its recommendations to the U.S. Congress. The Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, No. 4 of which was issued in October 1966, represent a very constructive program on the tax side of the picture. These, coupled with educational activities directed toward awareness of the ramifications of taxes, good rapport with the Internal Revenue Service and client education, needs to continue. Client education is certainly important because obviously practitioner accountants cannot carry the whole burden.

THE HYPOTHESIS IS INVESTIGATED THAT THE TIMING OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL OUTLAYS DEPENDS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND THE EXPECTED INTEREST RATE. THIS HYPOTHESIS IS FORMALIZED IN THE STOCK ADJUSTMENT MODEL IN WHICH THE ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT VARIES WITH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND THE EXPECTED INTEREST RATE. A STOCK ADJUSTMENT MODEL WITH A VARIABLE ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT WAS SET UP TO EXPLAIN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL OUTLAYS FOR HIGHWAYS FROM 1951 THROUGH 1966. THE MODEL IS DESCRIBED BY FIVE EQUATIONS WHICH EMBODY THE IDEA THAT CHANGES IN MONETARY POLICY CAUSE UNEXPECTED CHANGES IN INTEREST RATES THAT AFFECT THE SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE ACTUAL TO THE LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM STOCK OF HIGHWAYS. THE ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT EQUATION MEASURES THE RATE AT WHICH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ADAPT THE ACTUAL STOCK OF HIGHWAYS PER HEAD TO ITS LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL. ONE TERM IN THIS EQUATION MAKES ALLOWANCE FOR THE FACT THAT UNEXPECTED CHANGES IN INTEREST RATES AFFECT THE TIMING OF DECISIONS ON INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES BY AFFECTING THE TIMING OF BOND SALES. TO TEST THE VALIDITY OF THE VARIABLE ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT HYPOTHESIS, IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE AN ASSUMPTION ABOUT HOW STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE OFFICERS MAKE MUNICIPAL BOND RATE FORECASTS. EQUATIONS EMBODYING TWO THEORIES OF THE EXPECTED INTEREST RATE WERE TRIED. IT IS CONTENDED THAT IN THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY, THE INTEREST RATE DID NOT AFFECT THE LEVEL OF THE DESIRED CAPITAL STOCK. PERSONAL INCOME WAS USED AS A PROXY FOR THE DEMAND FOR TRAVEL BECAUSE IT INDICATES THE DEMAND FOR HIGHWAY SERVICES INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ACTUAL CURRENT STOCK OF HIGHWAYS. PERSONAL INCOME AND FEDERAL AID ARE TWO COMPONENTS WHICH APPEAR SEPARATELY IN THE DESIRED CAPITAL STOCK EQUATION BECAUSE EACH HAS A DIFFERENT IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF PLANNED CAPITAL OUTLAYS. TEST RESULTS STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPAL HYPOTHESIS. TABLES SHOW THE REGRESSION COEFFICIENT ESTIMATED WITH THE VARIABLE ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT MODEL THAT BEST EXPLAINS THE DATA, AND THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN MONETARY POLICY ON THE LEVEL OF STATE AND LOCAL HIGHWAY INVESTMENT. IN THIS MODEL THE IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN MONETARY POLICY DEPENDS ON TWO THINGS: (1) THE SIZE OF THE UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN THE INTEREWT RATE, AND (2) THE SIZE OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND THE LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM CAPITAL STOCK. THE MODEL IMPLIES THAT IF THE MONETARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD WANT TO DELAY EXPENDITURES FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THEY WOULD HAVE TO INCREASE INTEREST RATES CONTINUALLY.