This paper examines the contract between a risk-neutral firm and its risk-averse employees, assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment. Employers in an external spot labor market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm. The threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract. Layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels. A seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability.

This paper examines the change in trading costs for firms that choose to move from a dealer market to a specialist system. Using transactions data, our empirical results reveal structurally induced average trading cost reductions of 4.7 (5.2) cents per share for firms that moved from the NASDAQ/NMS to the NYSE (AMEX) in 1990. For NYSE listed stocks, the trading cost reductions are equally divided between quote improvements and the routing of trades to the NYSE. Trading cost improvements vary inversely with trade sizes and positively with dollar spreads. Finally, the greatest liquidity benefits from listing accrue to the less liquid stocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, G12, G20.

Nahum D. Melumad, Toshiyuki Shibano, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board: Regulation Through Veto-Based Delegation, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 1-37

We study the relationship between politics and economic growth in a simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflict among agents endowed with varying capital/labor shares. We establish several results regarding the factor ownership of the median individual and the level of taxation, redistribution, and growth. Policies that maximize growth are optimal only for a government that cares solely about pure “capitalists.” The greater the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower growth. We present empirical results that show that inequality in land and income ownership is negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth.

Reviews the book `The Accountant's Guide to Legal Liability and Ethics,' by Mark J. Epstein and Albert D. Spalding, Jr.

A new empirical model for intertemporal capital asset pricing is presented that allows both time‐varying risk premia and betas where the latter are identified from the dynamics of the conditional covariance of returns. The model is more successful in explaining the predictable variations in excess returns when the returns on the stock market and corporate bonds are included as risk factors than when the stock market is the single factor. Although changes in the covariance of returns induce variations in the betas, most of the predictable movements in returns are attributed to changes in the risk premia.

A new empirical model for intertemporal capital asset pricing is presented that allows both time-varying risk premia and betas where the latter are identified from the dynamics of the conditional covariance of returns. The model is more successful in explaining the predictable variations in excess returns when the returns on the stock market and corporate bonds are included as risk factors than when the stock market is the single factor. Although changes in the covariance of returns induce variations in the betas, most of the predictable movements in returns are attributed to changes in the risk premia. Copyright 1994 by American Finance Association.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)