Pension funds have pursued an active role in corporate governance, although some question their effectiveness and motivations. We examine the impact and motivation of pension fund activism by studying the shareholder proposals of the largest, most active funds from 1987 through 1993. We find significant heterogeneity across funds in activism objectives, tactics, and impact on target firms, consistent with differing investment strategies. We find the funds are more successful at monitoring and promoting change in target firms than previously recognized. We also find no evidence to support motivations other than fund value maximization.

We examine the equity ownership structure and board composition of a sample of 583 firms over the ten-year period 1983–1992. Our evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of firms exhibit large changes in ownership and board structure in any given year. These changes are correlated with one another and are not reversed in subsequent years. Ownership and board changes are strongly related to top executive turnover, prior stock price performance, and corporate control threats, but only weakly related to changes in firm-specific determinants of ownership and board structure. Furthermore, large ownership changes are typically preceded by economic shocks and followed by asset restructurings.

Controlling for labor productivity, income levels, and other possible determinants, there is a robust and statistically significant association between the extent of democracy and the level of manufacturing wages in a country. The association exists both across countries and over time within countries. The coefficient estimates suggest that nonnegligible wage improvements result from the enhancement of democratic institutions: average wages in a country like Mexico would be expected to increase by 10 to 40 percent if Mexico were to attain a level of democracy comparable to that prevailing in the United States. Political competition and participation seem to be the driving force behind the result.

CORRIGENDA Volume 37, June 1999 In "The Numerical Reliability of Econometric Software", by B. D. McCullough and H. D. Vinod, there are misprints in some equations on page 647 in the upper part of the left-hand column. The passage should read as follows: The normal equations are 6?^ + 61.5? ^ = 7.261 61.5?^ + 630.55? ^ = 74.5053 which yields a regression line of Y^ = ?3.478 + 0.457X. Suppose that the normal equations had been computed only to four significant digits as 6?^ + 61.5? ^ = 7.261 61.5?^ + 630.6? ^ = 74.50.

Numerous examples show that some econometric software packages contain serious flaws, and that users cannot safely assume that their software is accurate. A brief survey of the fundamentals of computer arithmetic discusses the sources of numerical error and emphasizes that computer arithmetic is not at all like pencil-and-paper arithmetic. Both users and developers of econometrics software should first pay attention to accuracy, and only later consider user-friendliness. Details are provided for assessing the accuracy of basic estimation routines, statistical distributions, and random number generators. More accuracy benchmarks are needed, especially for specialized econometric procedures.

This article examines a dynamic adverse‐selection model that generates equilibrium employment cycles. In the model, firms hire workers from unemployment, observe workers' productivity through time, and (following the profit‐maximizing rule) eventually fire unproductive workers. If hiring costs are low, the dynamical system converges to a steady state in which the unemployment pool contains mostly low‐ability workers. However, if hiring costs are sufficiently large, this “lemons effect” would make firms unwilling to hire workers. In this case, the system converges to a cyclical equilibrium in which firms alternate between hiring and not hiring.

We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, E51.