Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent's book, Recursive Models of Dynamic Linear Economies, exposits, extends, and applies methods for solution and analysis of dynamic stochastic linear quadratic models. The book, which can be used as a monograph or in a graduate course, integrates theory, econometrics, and computation. This essay provides a summary and offers some mild complaints about material not included in what is already a remarkably comprehensive book.

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.

Although governments are the majority shareholders in many of the world's largest and most important firms, we know very little about the role of the state as majority shareholder and the potential agency conflicts that exist between the state (as controlling shareholder) and the minority shareholder in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our study provides new insights regarding the private benefits that may be captured when the state is dominant shareholder (what we refer to as the “private benefits of state control”). We define the private benefits of state control as the political, social, or personal advantages that the controlling politician may be able to extract from the SOE. We identify firm-level and institution-level factors that may impact the amount of the private benefits of state control and present evidence that the private benefits of state control affect economic decision-making.

We propose a framework that advances our understanding of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) retention decisions in misreporting firms. Consistent with economic intuition, outside directors are more likely to fire (retain) CEOs when retention (replacement) costs are high relative to replacement (retention) costs. When the decision is ambiguous because neither cost dominates, outside directors are more likely to retain the CEO when they both benefit from selling stock in the misreporting period. We show that joint abnormal selling captures director–CEO alignment incrementally to biographical overlap. This new proxy operationalizes information sharing and trust, making it useful for studying economic decision-making embedded in social relationships.

Using distinct features of corporate bond exchange-traded funds (ETFs), I find that financial innovation has a significant and long-term positive valuation impact on the systemically important underlying securities. A one standard deviation increase in ETF ownership reduces high-yield and investment-grade bond spreads by 20.3 and 9.2 basis points, respectively, implying an average monthly price increase of 1.03% and 0.75%. Two novel quasi-natural experiments exploit exogenous changes in ETF eligibility to confirm the effect. Examining theoretical explanations for the effect, I find that ETFs decrease liquidity trader participation, increase institutional ownership, and insignificantly or negatively impact the liquidity of individual bonds.

Using a large sample of U.S. mortgages observed over the 2005–2009 period, we document contagion effects in strategic mortgage defaults. Strategic defaults result from borrowers choosing to exercise their in the money default option and our findings suggest this choice is influenced by the delinquency rate in surrounding zip codes (within a 5 mile radius), after controlling for other known determinants of mortgage default. These controls include a large array of borrower and loan characteristics, local demographic and economic conditions, spatial correlations, and changes in property values. Our findings that the local area delinquency rate is an important factor for strategic defaulters (borrowers that can be influenced in their decision) but not for defaults that are the result of inability to pay (borrowers that had no choice) lend support the contagion hypothesis. Our estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the local area delinquency rate may increase the probability of a strategic default by 7.25–16.5%.

This paper identifies the put-option, liquidity availability proportion, and shadow liquidity risk premia embedded within commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) using reduced form and structural generalization models. These risk values are then interpreted as trading signals which are tested with automated trading strategies that buy undervalued and sell overvalued CMBS from November 2007 through June 2015. All three signals generate substantial positive trading profits in testing for the reduced form model but not for the structural generalization. The risk signals constructed independently of market pricing provide more profitable automated trading insights than those constructed from interactions between modeled risk measures and market spreads. In my tests of the information content of the risk signals with respect to future macroeconomic indicators, I find statistically significant evidence in keeping with recent studies. While I cannot reject CMBS efficiency, this paper’s disclosure of new risk measures, the profitability of automated strategies based on those risk measures, and the statistical significance of their forward guidance capabilities, together contributes to our understanding of CMBS risk and the credit spread puzzle debate.